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TOPIC IV.A
LUNG-CHU CHEN
Constitutional Law and International Law in the
United States of America
I. INTRODUCTION
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquil-
ity, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.'
With these words the founders of the United States government
began the first written constitution, and thereby established the first
constitutional democracy in the modern era. At the time of its adop-
tion, the United States Constitution represented a radical idea: that
people could govern themselves through a system of written laws, not
by the edicts of some "divine" monarch. The more than two-hundred-
year history of this remarkable document is a testament o the dura-
bility of that idea. The American constitutional system has survived
civil war, economic upheaval, and social turmoil from within, and
weathered the challenges and pressures, and even the threats to its
very survival, from abroad. It remains as vibrant and vital today as
in the days of its creation, demonstrating a unique capacity to adapt
to the changing conditions and the evolving demands and expecta-
tions of modern life. While unique at its inception, the American con-
stitutional system has served as a model for numerous nations
around the world, a further testament to the enduring genius of its
founders.
The original Constitution, as adopted by the several states in
1789, consisted of only seven articles. Over the years, twenty-seven
amendments have been added. The Constitution is, however, greater
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than the sum of its written parts. It is a dynamic and continuous
process of communication, practice and decision through which the
citizens of the United States establish and maintain the basic fea-
tures of authoritative decision that govern their society. The Consti-
tution is not a process locked into any one given time or era. Through
the exercise of collective decision-making outlined by the Constitu-
tion, the citizens of the United States have ensured that the values
enshrined in the Constitution reflect not only the vision and goals of
those who originally drafted the document, but also the demands and
expectations of succeeding generations.
The strength of the American system of government derives from
several fundamental principles that are woven directly into the fabric
of the Constitution itself, which will be discussed in more detail later.
First, the American system is a federalism, where power is allocated
throughout a vertical structure of local, state and national govern-
ments.2 Second, power is also allocated horizontally within each
level, in a system commonly referred to as separation of powers.3 Fi-
nally, the basic human rights of the individual are protected against
intrusion and overreaching by the government through the very
structure of government itself as well as the interpretation and appli-
cation of a Bill of Rights.4 The result is a dynamic process through
which the people of the United States pursue their common interests
and secure "the Blessings of Liberty" for themselves and their
posterity.
5
The constitutional process of the United States operates in the
context of a world community of ever growing interdependence. An
important outcome of the continuous process of authoritative decision
in the United States is the shaping and sharing of community policies
regarding America's role in the global community and its conduct in
foreign affairs. The transparency of the American constitutional sys-
tem of governance allows individuals at all levels of American society
2. See infra Sec. II.A.
3. See infra Sec. III.A.
4. The first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution, commonly referred to as
the Bill of Rights, explicitly provide for limitations on federal power vis-a-vis the indi-
vidual, including freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, the right to bear arms,
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to a jury trial, and the guar-
antee of due process of law. See U.S. Const. amends. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7. The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted after the Civil War, incorporates many of these rights and ap-
plies them to the states. See U.S. Const. amend. 14. The Fourteenth Amendment
also guarantees the equal protection of the laws. See id. Like the Constitution itself,
the Bill of Rights is not a static set of guarantees. It is a dynamic process of continu-
ing communication, practice and decision through which generations of Americans
have secured freedom from the possibility of oppressive government and majoritarian
tyranny.
5. For a more complete discussion of the dynamic nature of the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, see generally Chen, "Institutions Specialized to
the Protection of Human Rights in the United States," 1 N.YL. Sch. Hum. Rts. Ann. 3
(1983).
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to contribute to the establishment and application of inclusive world
order decisions.
6
Equally important is the effect of world order decisions on the
national law of the United States. Two theories have emerged from
the traditional debate over the nature of the relationship between in-
ternational law and national aw: dualist theory and monist theory.
Under dualist theory, international law and national law are two sep-
arate and distinct bodies of law. Each system has its own subjects,
structures and processes of authority, and content. The typical pro-
cess by which international law becomes national (or municipal) law,
under dualist theory, is by "adoption," "incorporation," "transforma-
tion," and so on.
Monist theory, on the other hand, holds that there is a unitary
legal system. International law and national law each have the same
subjects, sources, and content, generally with international law
supreme over national law. Norms, under the monist theory, fall
within levels or hierarchies, with international norms generally at
the top of the pyramid.
Common to both systems is a focus on norms or "rules." The
problem with both theories, and the rules-based approach in general,
is that they fail to adequately account for and describe the entire pro-
cess of authoritative decision-making.7 This is particularly true in
the changing context of global and national interdependence. In a
world of global communications, an increasingly interdependent
economy, transboundary environmental impacts, and modern weap-
ons and techniques of war, people from opposite ends of the globe
have a real and dramatic effect on each other. Decisions made locally
can have inclusive effects, with impacts reaching the national, re-
gional, and international levels. Consequently, just as decision
processes within the United States have effects on the international
community, decision processes in other nations and in intergovern-
mental organizations at the regional and international levels impact
and affect conditions, and ultimately the law, in the United States.8
The dynamics of this interpenetrating process of decision-making
means that at times, there will be conflicts between national and in-
ternational law. When such conflicts arise, it is imperative that in-
ternational law should prevail. The supremacy of international law
6. See infra Sec. VII.
7. For a more detailed criticism of the rule-centered approach to international
law, and a description of the New Haven School policy-oriented approach, see Lung-
chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective 3-22 (1989).
8. See McDougal, "The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Pol-
icy-Oriented Perspective," in, Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Interna-
tional Law Essays: A Supplement to International Law in Contemporary Perspective
437 (1981).
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is essential to the maintenance of world order and ensures that the
inclusive policies of the world community are put into effective
practice.
The supremacy of international law is generally recognized
within the constitutional system of the United States. The Constitu-
tion itself provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land.9
Through practice and judicial interpretation, other types of interna-
tional agreements have been held to have the same status as treaties
as supreme law. International customary law, although not supreme
law in the sense of treaties and international agreements, is consid-
ered to be part of the federal common law, applicable by both state
and federal judges. Through each of these modalities, the inclusive
policies and world order goals of the international community become
effective law in the United States binding on the nation itself as a
member of the community of nations, as well as upon individuals
within the United States where applicable.
This report will explore the constitutional processes that govern
the establishment and conduct of American foreign affairs. Within
this broad outline, there are several areas of special concern. First,
the report will describe the vertical allocation of powers that govern
foreign affairs - the vertical allocation of powers refers to the rela-
tionship between the federal government and the several state gov-
ernments that make up the United States, and the division of
responsibility between them.
Second, the horizontal allocation of power - the relationship be-
tween the several branches of the federal government - will be ex-
plored. Because foreign affairs powers are shared among the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, issues re-
garding the competency of the branches to act in foreign affairs, ques-
tions regarding separation of powers, and issues of checks and
balances continually arise. In particular, the President's role as sole
representative of the United States in foreign affairs, the Congress's
shared responsibility for the formulation of American foreign policy,
and the judiciary's role as final arbiter and interpreter of interna-
tional law will be discussed.
Finally, a theme running throughout this report is the role of the
citizen, both in an individual capacity and as a member of groups, in
the external affairs of the United States. By focusing on all partici-
pants, the dynamics and full complexity of the American foreign af-
fairs decision making process will be revealed.
9. See U.S. Const. art. VI.
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II. THE VERTICAL ALLOCATION OF POWERS
A. The Federal System in Action in the United States
A central feature of the United States constitutional system is
that it is a federalism in which power is distributed vertically among
overlapping governments. At the top of the structure is the federal,
or national, government encompassing the entire territorial United
States. Below the federal government are the fifty states, each with
its own state government and territory. Each state is then further
divided into local subdivisions.
To better understand how American federalism operates, it is
helpful to examine the history behind the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. In 1781, at the close of the American War of Independence, the
thirteen original colonies formed a loose confederation under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. The purpose of the Articles of Confederation
was to ensure some unity of the states in dealing with common for-
eign and domestic problems: but the overriding understanding was
that the states would remain sovereign. The Articles provided for a
single organ of the national government, a Congress, with very lim-
ited powers: the sole and exclusive right and power to determine is-
sues of peace and war; the authority to resolve disputes between the
states; the power to regulate the value and alloy of coin; the authority
to deal with the native American Indian tribes; the power to establish
or regulate post offices; and the power to appoint naval and other
officers in federal service. The key powers lacking in the federal gov-
ernment under the Articles were the power to tax and the power to
regulate commerce. Moreover, there was no executive or general ju-
dicial power at the national level.
Due to the very limited powers of the federal government estab-
lished under the Articles of Confederation, the thirteen states soon
encountered a variety of problems. Congress was unable to raise the
revenues necessary for the functioning of the national government
and for the payment of the national debt incurred during the War of
Independence, and the states could not be counted upon to fulfill
their obligations. Without a national executive power, the federal
government found it difficult to conduct both domestic and foreign
affairs. Finally, interstate rivalries and jealousies led to retaliatory
trade wars among the states, inhibiting the free flow of interstate
commerce.
By 1786, it had become clear that amendments were needed to
remedy the problems facing the thirteen states. A convention was
held in Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation. How-
1994] 457
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ever, the delegates went beyond their mandate, and negotiated a
completely new document, the Constitution.10
The new Constitution retained some of the features of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. Under the Constitution, the states are still au-
tonomous entities with the full police powers generally associated
with sovereign states. The autonomy of the states is reflected in the
Tenth Amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."" The sover-
eign immunity of the states is reflected in the Eleventh Amendment,
which provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'
2
The federal government provided for in the Constitution, as
under the Articles of Confederation, is still a government of limited
powers, capable of exercising only those powers ceded to it by the
states and enumerated in the Constitution.13 However, the Constitu-
tion provided the federal government several key powers that it
lacked under the Articles of Confederation: the power to lay and col-
lect taxes; the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
among the several states, and with the native American Indian
tribes; the power to make all laws necessary and proper to exercise
its enumerated powers; and several key foreign affairs powers.
The American federal system - several autonomous states
joined together under a national government of limited powers -
was designed to promote several important values. It was intended
that the states retain an important function within the constitutional
framework. Most of the important functions of government would be
conducted at the state level; the federal government would only be
necessary during times of war.' 4 Federalism was thought to en-
courage experimentation, where each state would be free to develop
and implement new solutions to problems without risk to the entire
nation, and to foster efficiency by allowing states to tailor solutions to
local problems. Moreover, federalism was thought to promote indi-
vidual choice and democracy by allowing citizens more direct input
into matters of local concern.
10. For a discussion of the history of the Constitution, see Geoffrey R. Stone et al.,
Constitutional Law 1-21 (2d ed. 1991). For a more complete study, see Max Farrand,
The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (13th ptg. 1978).
11. U.S. Const. amend. 10 (the 10th Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill of
Rights in 1791).
12. Id. amend. 11 (the 11th Amendment was adopted in 1798).
13. See id. art. I, sec. 8.
14. See The Federalist Nos. 45 and 46 (Madison).
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The framers' vision of a national government which would be
necessary only during times of war proved to be unrealistic. As dis-
cussed below, with the expansion of the commerce power, the federal
government has grown both in power and in importance.15 Neverthe-
less, federalism still thrives even today, and the essential tension be-
tween federal and state power remains a vital feature of the
American constitutional system, as illustrated by the argument over
"States Rights" and the present trend in state courts to interpret and
apply state constitutions as separate and distinct from the federal
Constitution.
B. The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Government
One area in which the federal government is considered to have
full plenary powers, exclusive of the States, is in the area of foreign
affairs. Nothing in the Constitution expressly provides for the exclu-
sive federal foreign affairs power. Nevertheless, it is generally ac-
cepted that the foreign affairs powers are exclusively federal, either
expressly, as in the treaty power, or inherently, as in the power to
declare war. States generally lack competence to act in the arena of
foreign relations.
The rationale for exclusive federal foreign affairs power was
elaborated by the United-States Supreme Court in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.16 In that case, the Court ruled on the
validity of a congressional joint resolution delegating to the president
the power to declare certain arms sales illegal. In upholding the reso-
lution, the Court held that the foreign affairs powers of the United
States are exclusively vested in the federal government. The Court
reasoned that foreign affairs powers are different from internal af-
fairs powers. The principle that the federal government can only ex-
ercise the powers enumerated in the Constitution applies only to
internal affairs - the domestic powers of the federal government
were "carved out" of the realm of sovereign powers retained by the
states, and are therefore limited. In contrast, the Court found that
the several states had never had any foreign affairs powers: powers
in foreign affairs transferred directly from the British Crown to the
colonies in their "collective and corporate capacity" as the United
States of America. Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was
intended by the colonies that the federal government possessed full
foreign affairs powers, and these powers were retained by the federal
government with the adoption of the Constitution. Because the for-
eign affairs powers of the federal government were not ceded to it by
the states, the exercise of those powers did not require an affirmative
grant in the Constitution. Rather, the federal government's foreign
15. See infra Sec. 1.C.
16. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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affairs power is an inherent aspect of the sovereignty of the United
States, and is equal in rights and powers to those exercised by all
other members of the international community.
While the foreign affairs power in its totality is not expressly
granted in the Constitution, various aspects of this power are. For
example, the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to establish uni-
form rules of naturalization, to define and punish offenses against
the law of nations, and to declare war. The President is the com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces, and has the power to make trea-
ties with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Supreme Court
has the power to decide cases arising under treaties made under the
authority of the Constitution. Each of these and other powers, and
the competency of each branch of the federal government to exercise
them will be explored in later sections.
C. The Role of State and Local Government
Because the states of the United States are not independent
"states" as defined under international law, they do not have the com-
petence to conduct foreign affairs. As the Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Belmont,17 "In respect of ... our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State . . .
does not exist." States are expressly prohibited by the Constitution
from entering into any treaty, entering into an agreement with a for-
eign nation without the consent of Congress, or engaging in war un-
less actually invaded. Moreover, states are prohibited from laying
any imposts or duties on exports or imports, and state regulations or
taxes that unduly burden foreign commerce are invalid.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that,
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all
Treaties made.., under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land" and the states are bound to observe
that law."' Based on the exclusive authority of the federal govern-
ment in the foreign affairs area, the courts have held that not only
treaties, but other international agreements and customary law are
part of the supreme law of the United States, and are therefore bind-
ing on the states.'9 Any state law that is inconsistent with a treaty
or executive agreement is invalid. Moveover, the Supremacy Clause
implies that even when a state law is not inconsistent with federal
law, the state law is invalid if the federal government has expressed
17. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
18. U.S. Const. art. VI.
19. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-31
(1942).
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a purpose or policy through "preemption," or by completely occupying
a field by legislation.
20
The commerce power of the federal government also illustrates
the plenary nature of the federal foreign affairs power. The Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the fed-
eral government has the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .. -21 Although at one time
the commerce power was interpreted narrowly, under modern doc-
trine, the power of the federal government to regulate commerce
among the states is considered to be very broad.22 Consequently,
states cannot adopt laws which are inconsistent with federal law.
When Congress is silent regarding the federal regulation of com-
merce, under the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, states may
adopt regulations as long as those measures are not inconsistent with
federal policy or unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.
As broad as the domestic commerce power may be, the foreign
commerce power may be even broader. For example, in the case of
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,2 3 the Supreme Court
struck down a California nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on for-
eign-owned cargo containers of international commerce. The Court
found evidence that the framers of the Constitution intended the
scope of the foreign commerce power to be even broader than the do-
mestic commerce power due to the overriding concern that the federal
government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments. The Court then found that the
California law prevented uniformity "in an area where federal uni-
formity is essential."24 Because the tax prevented the government
from "speaking with one voice," the Court invalidated the California
law.
The courts have also held that the Constitution bars intrusion by
the states into foreign affairs matters that are entrusted to the Con-
gress or to the President, even where there is no federal law in the
field, and even when the federal government recognizes that there is
no conflict between the state law and the conduct of foreign policy.
For example, in Zschernig v. Miller,2 5 the Supreme Court struck
down an Oregon state probate law, which prevented persons residing
in communist countries from inheriting property left to them by Ore-
gon residents. Even though the State Department indicated that the
Oregon law did not unduly interfere with the United States' conduct
20. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
21. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
22. See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 136-87 (4th ed.
1991).
23. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
24. Id. at 455.
25. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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of foreign affairs, the Court reasoned that the Oregon law might dis-
turb foreign relations and required a state probate court to base its
decision on foreign policy considerations normally reserved to the fed-
eral government. Therefore, the Court held the Oregon statute
unconstitutional.
In spite of these constitutional restrictions on state and local in-
trusion into foreign affairs, state and municipal entities do play some
roles in international affairs. As the world becomes ever more inter-
dependent, state and local activities, particularly in the economic
area, have an international impact.26 One illustration is the various
tax incentives and public investment programs undertaken by state
and local governments in order to encourage foreign investment and
attract foreign-owned businesses. States have sent trade missions
abroad to encourage foreign companies to locate production facilities
in their states or cities. State and local governments also have an
influence as market participants. For example, a number of state
and local governments divested their pension funds of South African
investments in protest over that country's apartheid policies and
practices.
In the diplomatic area, many American cities now have sister cit-
ies in a variety of foreign nations, encouraging international ex-
change and developing international understanding. Local sanctuary
movements, where local governments pledged not to enforce federal
immigration laws, represented a more direct challenge to federal poli-
cies in providing asylum to refugees who were not being protected
under federal law. In these ways and others, state and local govern-
ments are important participants in international affairs, constitu-
tional prohibitions notwithstanding. These examples have led one
commentator to note, "where foreign affairs begin to touch the states,
whether in their particular economic interests ... or even in small
matters of pride or prejudice or principle, the plenary powers of the
national government take on all the colors of federalism."
27
D. The Impact of Supranational Organizations
With the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
throughout the Twentieth Century, another layer of complexity has
been added to the vertical allocation of powers between the federal
and state governments. Intergovernmental organizations - whether
global, as in the case of the United Nations; regional, as in the case of
26. See Bilder, "The Role of State and Cities in Foreign Relations," in, Louis Hen-
kin et al. (eds.), "Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 115 (1990) [hereinafter
Foreign Affairs]. For an overview of state and local activities in foreign affairs, see
generally the materials set out in Thomas M. Franck & Michael J. Glennon, Foreign
Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and Simulations 685-722
(1987).
27. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 247 (1972).
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the Organization of American States; or issue-specific, such as in the
case of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - often
include intergovernmental decision-making bodies and third-party
dispute resolution mechanisms that, at least theoretically, have
power to set policy, resolve disputes, and establish law for their mem-
bers. The existence of IGOs raises a variety of questions under
United States constitutional law: To what extent do decisions of IGO
decision-making bodies create binding obligations within the United
States? Does participation in IGOs alter the basic outline of shared
powers within each level of government? Between the federal and
state levels?
In general, whether a resolution by a decision-making body of an
IGO imposes binding obligations on the United States depends on the
authority conferred upon such organizations in the constitutive
agreements that create them. For example, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) may prescribe rules regarding exchange rates and
currency depreciation. The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion may set binding standards applicable to the civil aviation indus-
try. The United Nations Security Council may authorize the use of
force to maintain international peace and security.
Thus far, however, there is no IGO to which the United States
has ceded sufficient sovereignty paralleling the arrangement be-
tween the states and the federal government in the Constitution.
This has a variety of implications, particularly regarding the war
power, which will be discussed in more detail later.28 In general,
however, there is no international "Supremacy Clause" that would
make a resolution of an IGO the "law of the land" in the United
States, as is the case with federal law vis-a-vis state law.
As a result, the international obligations of the United States are
subject to normal constitutional processes before they become binding
on the nation. The U.N. Security Council resolutions, authorizing the
use of force in international police actions, provide an illustration.
United States practice in both Korea and Kuwait suggests that the
President, absent the negotiation of agreements between the United
States and the Security Council pursuant to Article 43 of the United
Nations Charter, is constitutionally required to obtain authorization
from Congress in order to commit United States troops to combat ac-
tions authorized by the Security Council, at least where such action
would exceed the President's own war powers. Even were the Presi-
dent to commit troops pursuant to some hypothetical special agree-
ment under the United Nations Charter, the constitutionality of such
action would seem to rest on the agreement's prior authorization and
28. See infra Sec. V.C.
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ratification by the Senate exercising its constitutional role in treaty
making.2
9
While IGOs do not generally possess the power to create law in
the United States similar to the power exercised by the federal gov-
ernment relative to the states, their importance in the vertical alloca-
tion of power should not be underestimated. As the world becomes
more interdependent, and as nation-states turn to international bod-
ies in the pursuit of their common interests and goals, the impact of
supranational organizations on the constitutional processes in the
United States will become increasingly more relevant and important.
Whether the United States will ever agree to cede key aspects of its
sovereignty to a regional or global organization remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, recent trends suggest greater contributions to, and co-
operation with, supranational organizations, reinforcing expectations
of the authoritativeness of supranational organizations in interna-
tional decision making.
III. THE HORIZONTAL ALLOCATION OF POWERS
A. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Its Application
In addition to federalism, another principal feature of the U.S.
constitutional system is the principle of separation of powers. While
separation of powers is not subject to clear definition, it is, in general,
the constitutional effort to allocate different sorts of governmental
power into three separate and distinct branches: the legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial branches. The Constitution expressly provides for
separation of powers by vesting all legislative powers granted by the
Constitution in the Congress,30 all executive power in the Presi-
dent,31 and all judicial power in the Supreme Court and in the "infer-
ior" courts established by Congress.
32
The primary purpose of separation of powers was to prevent tyr-
anny. To the framers of the Constitution, the concentration of all
powers in the same hands was the very definition of tyranny.33 The
framers were particularly wary of the legislative branch, which they
believed would draw all power into its vortex; hence, separation of
powers was to prevent legislative encroachment on liberty and pri-
vate life. 34 Separating the power to make laws from the power to
enforce them ensured that the legislature could not pass oppressive
laws knowing that they would be exempt.
29. See Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Char-
ter," 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 74 (1991).
30. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 1.
31. Id. art. II, sec; 1.
32. Id. art. III, sec. 1.
33. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).
34. See The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).
464
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Separation of powers also' served several other purposes. Be-
cause separation of powers prevented the accumulation of all power
in one branch, it would force public officials to act in the public inter-
est, rather than in their own private interest, by pitting the ambi-
tions of one branch against the others. Separation of powers also
provided a partial answer to the framers' fear that factions would
take control of the government. Because legislation must be passed
by officials with state-wide constituencies (the Senate) and with na-
tion-wide constituencies (the President) before it becomes law, fac-
tions with parochial or local interests would be prevented from
controlling the government. Finally, because no power could be
brought to bear without a broad consensus, separation of powers
makes it more difficult for the federal government to act quickly,
thereby limiting government action and protecting individual liberty.
A related, though distinct, principle is that of checks and bal-
ances. While separation of powers refers to the separation of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial functions into separate, distinct
branches, checks and balances refers to the vesting of specific aspects
of each of these powers in each of the separate branches. The framers
did not want complete separation of powers among the branches.
They believed that some overlap in powers was necessary to allow a
branch to protect itself from encroachment by the other branches.35
A constitutional system of checks and balances ensured that the sys-
tem would be able to guard against usurpation of authority by any
one branch.36
The legislative process illustrates the principle of checks and bal-
ances under the United States Constitution. To provide a presiden-
tial check on congressional power, the Presentment Clause requires
that all legislation be presented to the President for signature before
it becomes law, and provides the President with the power to veto
legislation as he or she sees fit. 37 This presidential participation in
the legislative process protects the executive branch from Congress,
and protects the nation as a whole against improvident, ill-conceived,
and hastily drawn laws.38 The President's veto power, on the other
hand, is limited by Congress's power to overrule a presidential veto
with a two-thirds vote of both the House of Representatives and the
Senate,39 thereby precluding the final arbitrary act of a single
individual.40
35. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).
36. See Richardson, "Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations," in Foreign Af-
fairs, supra n. 26, at 25.
37. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2.
38. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-48 (1983).
39. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2.
40. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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The separation of the Congress into two chambers, the House of
Representative and the Senate, is a further example of checks and
balances. When the idea of a single House was discussed at the Con-
stitutional Convention, several of the delegates objected strongly,
contending that the accumulation of all legislative power in one body
would result in the type of tyranny the Constitution was designed to
prevent. Moreover, delegates from the smaller states were concerned
that the large states would use their numerical majority to pass laws
antithetical to their interests, and the large states were concerned
about a legislature that could pass laws favoring the smaller states
and, thus, a minority of the people. In response, the Congress was
divided into two branches: the House of Representatives, in which the
Representatives would be elected in proportion to the number of peo-
ple within each state, and the Senate, with each state, whether large
or small, represented by two Senators. This bicameral arrangement,
known as the Great Compromise,41 provided another check on unlim-
ited legislative power by requiring that legislation pass both the
House of Representatives, which represents the people, and the Sen-
ate, which represents the states.42
Beyond this broad outline of separation of powers and checks and
balances, these concepts are not capable of precise legal definition.
While the Constitution divides the federal government into the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches, it does not expressly deline-
ate the distinction between their functions. As a result, some
commentators have suggested that the principle of separation of pow-
ers is a "political doctrine" and not a technical rule of law.43 Courts
confronted with intergovernmental disputes have often resorted to a
variety of interpretative tools when resolving separation of powers
questions, a process made particularly difficult when the Constitu-
tion is silent or fails to make express provision for particular contin-
gencies. When the text of the Constitution is silent on whether a
particular power is within a particular branch of government, the
courts have turned to analysis of the framers' intent and to custom
and practice as alternative sources of authority.44
The problems involved the application of separation of powers is
illustrated by the case of INS v. Chadha.45 At issue in Chadha was
the constitutionality of a statute that allowed the House of Repre-
sentatives to overturn decisions of the U.S. Attorney General (an of-
41. See Farrand, supra n. 10, at 91-112.
42. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950.
43. See Frankfurter & Landis, "Power of Congress of Procedure in Criminal Con-
tempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts - A Study in Separation of Powers," 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 1010 (1924).
44. See Glennon, "The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Power Disputes,"
64 B.U. L. Rev. 109 (1984).
45. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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ficer in the executive branch) regarding the deportation of aliens
through the use of a simple resolution. Exercising this "legislative
veto," the House voted to reverse the Attorney General's decision not
to deport a student who had remained in the United States after the
expiration of his visa. A majority of the United States Supreme
Court held that this legislative veto was unconstitutional. The Court
first found that the act of the House was legislative in nature because
it altered legal rights, duties and relations outside the legislative
branch. However, because the action was undertaken by a simple
resolution of the House, and not passed by the Senate and presented
to the President, it violated constitutional requirements of bicamera-
lism and presentment. In ruling the legislative veto unconstitu-
tional, the Court looked to both the textual provision of the
Constitution detailing the legislative process, and the intent of the
framers for including bicameralism and presentment in that process.
The difficulty inherent in the rationale of the majority in Chadha
is belied by the opinions of other justices on the Court. Justice Pow-
ell, in concurrence, reasoned that the action by the House was essen-
tially judicial in nature, because it determined the rights of an
individual rather than the rights of broad classes, and was therefore
a violation of separation of powers.46 On the other hand, Justice
White, in dissent, took a more flexible approach, suggesting that not
all legislative vetoes should be unconstitutional. In White's opinion,
legislative vetoes allow Congress to maintain a check over the Execu-
tive when it delegates authority.47 As long as the underlying pur-
poses of the framers are served - preventing overexpansion of
presidential and agency power - White believed legislative vetoes
should not automatically be voided.48 In support of his argument,
Justice White reviewed the fifty-year history of the use of legislative
vetoes in a variety of laws and contexts.49 Moreover, he noted that
the doctrine of separation of powers was not intended to be rigid and
inflexible:
[T]he wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Na-
tion would grow and new problems of governance would re-
quire different solutions. Accordingly, our Federal
Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility
to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of
fundamental democratic principles. This was the spirit in
which Justice Jackson penned his influential concurrance in
the Steel Seizure Case: . . . "While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
46. See id. at 964-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. See id. at 967-68, 972-74 (White, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 977-79, 1002.
49. See id. at 968-72.
1994]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government."50
It is from this perspective of cooperation and accommodation that
Justice White believed the legislative veto should be evaluated.
B. Separation of Powers and Foreign Affairs
Principles of separation of powers apply with equal force in for-
eign affairs as they do in domestic affairs. But because many foreign
affairs functions are not clearly delineated in the Constitution nor
attributed to particular branches, many separation of powers issues
are left unresolved. Even when the Constitution expressly commits
certain foreign affairs powers to a specific branch, the scope of those
powers remains subject to controversy, particularly when the exer-
cise of those powers by one branch impinges on powers that tradition-
ally fall within the domestic powers of another branch. Moreover,
because the courts are often hesitant to adjudicate in the foreign af-
fairs arena, issues of separation of powers are resolved, if at all, by
political struggles between the President and Congress, with the
President most often winning.
The Constitution does make explicit, although sparse, allocation
of foreign affairs powers among the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment. For example, the Constitution expressly provides that the
President is the commander in chief of the armed forces of the United
States,51 and directs that the President "shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed."52 In addition, the President has the power to
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate,53 and has the sole power to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers from foreign nations.54 Con-
gress, on the other hand, in addition to its general powers to appro-
priate funds for the functioning of the federal government (commonly
known as the "power of the purse") and its power to make all laws
"necessary and proper" for executing the powers granted by the Con-
stitution, is also given the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations; to define and punish piracy, felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to declare war; and to
raise, support and provide rules regulating the armed forces of the
United States.
55
Due to the vagaries of each of these enumerated powers, how-
ever, issues of separation of powers often arise even when the Presi-
50. Id. at 978 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952)).
51. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
52. Id. art. II, sec. 3.
53. Id. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
54. Id. art. II, sec. 3.
55. Id. art. I, sec. 8.
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dent or Congress exercises its exclusive powers, leading to assertions
of interference by the other branches. For example, there is continu-
ing controversy over the competency of the President to commit
American forces to foreign wars based upon his role as commander in
chief without obtaining an express declaration of war by Congress.
Conversely, it is unclear how far the Congress can limit the Presi-
dent's decisions as commander in chief when exercising its power to
regulate the armed forces.
Issues of separation of powers are also complicated by the consti-
tutional blurring of the prescribing (law-making) function in foreign
affairs. In domestic affairs, the Congress is generally considered to
be the predominant law-making body in the federal government.
However, the Constitution expressly provides that the President has
the power to make treaties with foreign nations, with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.56 This bifurcation of the pre-
scribing function raises a variety of separation of powers questions:
To what extent may the Senate alter treaties already negotiated by
the President in its advice and consent function? To what extent is
Congress as a whole obliged to pass domestic legislation to comply
with international obligations undertaken pursuant to treaties? Can
Congress defeat treaties ratified by the Senate by passing conflicting
domestic legislation? Furthermore, what role does Congress play in
the adoption of executive agreements with foreign nations and the
development of customary international law?
Finally, a whole host of foreign affairs powers are not even men-
tioned by the Constitution. No mention is made of which branch has
the power to recognize or derecognize foreign nations. While the Con-
stitution does vest the power to declare war in the Congress, no men-
tion is made of which branch has the power to terminate a state of
war. The Constitution also fails to make mention of any "emergency"
powers that might be available to the President when an interna-
tional crisis threatens domestic security, or when the conduct of for-
eign affairs requires emergency measures within the United States.
In resolving separation of powers issues in foreign affairs, Jus-
tice Jackson's famous formula is often cited. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,57 Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion
suggested:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate ....
56. Id. art. II, sec. 2, c. 2.
57. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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2. When the President acts in absence of either a Con-
gressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely on
his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight
in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is
at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own con-
stitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Con-
gress over the matter .... 58
Given the general lack of clear separation of foreign affairs pow-
ers under the Constitution, it has been suggested that foreign affairs
powers fall generally in Justice Jackson's second category of concur-
rent presidential and congressional power. However, neither Justice
Jackson nor any other authority provides clear guidance about which
branch should prevail when conflicts in the exercise of these concur-
rent powers arise. As a result, the scope of foreign affairs powers as
currently exercised by the branches has been arrived at by a variety
of means including extrapolation from expressly granted powers,
practice, custom, and accommodation among the branches.
How some of the issues in separation of powers in foreign affairs
have been resolved in specific instances will be discussed in more de-
tail later. Suffice it to say at this point that separation of powers
remains a vital and hotly disputed principle in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, with resolution often taking on the character of polit-
ical accommodation rather than the application of a legally-defined
principle.
IV. THE EXTERNAL COMPETENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
A. The President as Both Head of State and Head of Government
In the United States constitutional system of government, the
President serves as both the head of state and the head of govern-
ment. This arrangement is unique among the major powers of the
world, leading one commentator to suggest hat the office of the Pres-
ident is like combining the office of the British sovereign with that of
the Prime Minister.
59
The Constitutional provision that created this arrangement sim-
ply provides, "The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America."60 The consequences of the dual func-
tion of the President as head of state and head of government are
58. Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
59. See Arthur S. Miller, Presidential Power in a Nutshell 21-24 (1977).
60. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1.
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several: most importantly, as head of state, the President has certain
"inherent" powers, and is entitled to certain executive privileges of
presidential confidentiality. Moreover, although the Constitution
provides for shared foreign affairs powers between the President and
Congress, the President often has the "upper hand" in struggles to
assert foreign policy prerogatives. Consequently, if sovereignty is
found anywhere in the federal government, it is found in the
President.
B. Presidential Foreign Affairs Powers in General
The President is generally considered to have the paramount
power to represent the United States in relations with other nations.
In the leading case in the area, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp.,61 Justice Sutherland summarized the President's power
in this way:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. . . .As Marshall said in his
great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Represent-
atives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in ex-
ternal relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations."62
Justice Sutherland then went on to say that the President's authority
as "sole organ" for the United States with regard to foreign nations is
"delicate, plenary, and exclusive," and does not require an act of Con-
gress as a basis for its exercise.
The decision to make the President he sole representative of the
United States in foreign affairs derived from past experiences under
the Articles of Confederation. Under the Articles, there was no exec-
utive power or officer in the federal government. Instead, Congress
itself conducted all foreign affairs activities, including receiving am-
bassadors and negotiating treaties. However, collective responsibil-
ity in foreign relations proved to be unworkable: Congress was often
slow to act due to the deliberative process itself; disputes among
members of Congress led to conflicting communications with foreign
officials, and secrecy during treaty negotiations was often impossible
to maintain. Moreover, Congress could not guarantee that the sev-
eral states would comply with the international obligations it under-
took. As the credibility and the prestige of the new United States in
foreign relations declined, the need for an executive agent to repre-
sent the United States was keenly felt. This was one of the reasons
the framers of the Constitution separated the xecutive powers from
61. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
62. Id. at 319.
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the Congress, placing them within an executive branch under the au-
thority of the President.
While the President is generally considered to have full, plenary
powers to represent the United States in foreign affairs, there is no
express provision for such power in the Constitution. The express
powers of the President include the power to make treaties, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and the power to appoint am-
bassadors, public ministers and consuls with the advice and consent
of the Senate.63 The President also has the express authority to re-
ceive ambassadors and other public ministers.64 Other general
grants of executive power that have foreign affairs implications in-
clude the vesting of all executive power in the President,65 the Presi-
dent's authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,66 and the
President's obligation to "take care" that the laws of the United
States be "faithfully executed."67 Despite these limited grants of for-
eign affairs powers, the President's authority in practice is much
broader.
The most persuasive rationale for broad presidential power in
foreign affairs was asserted by Alexander Hamilton, one of the fram-
ers and an early supporter of the Constitution. In Hamilton's view,
broad presidential power in foreign affairs was implicit in the general
grant of all executive powers under Article II. Any foreign affairs
powers not expressly granted to the Congress devolved by implication
to the President by operation of the Executive Power Clause.68 For
example, the power to recognize and derecognize foreign states is
generally implied from the President's power to receive foreign am-
bassadors and consuls, such as when the first President, George
Washington, recognized the revolutionary government of France by
receiving "Citizen" Genet, and then later terminated relations with
France by having Genet recalled.69 In addition, the President's sole
power to conduct treaty negotiations with foreign powers and keep
the contents of such negotiations secret is implied from the Presi-
dent's power to appoint individuals to conduct foreign affairs negotia-
tions. President Washington, for example, refused to comply with a
request by the House of Representatives to give Congress papers re-
lating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1796, claiming exclusive
powers in the area of treaty negotiation and thereby limiting Con-
gress's role.
63. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
64. Id. art. II, sec. 3.
65. Id. art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1.
66. Id. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
67. Id. art. II, sec. 3.
68. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 22, at 198.
69. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that the Presi-
dent has the sole authority not only to determine which governments to recognize, but
also the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition).
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The Supreme Court affirmed a broad interpretation of the Presi-
dent's power as the sole organ for the conduct of foreign affairs in the
Curtiss-Wright case.70 In Curtiss-Wright, the Congress, by joint reso-
lution, provided that the President could make findings and issue
proclamations banning arms sales to certain countries to preserve re-
gional peace. The President subsequently issued a proclamation ban-
ning arms sales to Bolivia. The defendants, who were indicted for
selling arms to Bolivia in violation of the order, challenged it as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President by
Congress.
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the order. The Court as-
sumed that if this delegation had taken place in the context of domes-
tic affairs, it would be unconstitutional. However, because the
delegation was in the context of foreign affairs, where the federal gov-
ernment has exclusive and plenary power, it was a permissible dele-
gation. Moreover, the Court found that the authority of the President
to act in this area was not only supported by the act of Congress, but
also by the President's own powers in foreign affairs, which the Court
characterized as plenary and subject only to constitutional limita-
tions. Taking a pragmatic view of modern foreign affairs, Justice
Sutherland, writing for the majority, reasoned that the need for
greater discretion and efficiency in foreign affairs, the need for se-
crecy in international negotiations, and the greater expertise and ac-
cess to confidential information available to the President from the
diplomatic staff further supported broad presidential authority in for-
eign affairs.
7 1
Despite the broad affirmance of presidential power in foreign af-
fairs in Curtiss-Wright, the President's exercise of foreign affairs
powers is not without limit, particularly when the President acts con-
trary to congressional will. For example, in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,72 (the "Steel Seizure Case"), President Truman
seized steel mills during the Korean War to prevent their closure due
to a labor contract dispute. Truman based his power not on any legis-
lative act, but on his broad powers as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, the general grant of executive powers under Article II
of the Constitution, and the Faithful Execution Clause. The Presi-
dent argued that the aggregate of these executive powers gave him
the "inherent power" to prevent a strike that would disrupt steel pro-
duction, and thereby threaten the well-being and safety of the nation
during war.
The Supreme Court rejected Truman's assertions and struck
down the steel. seizure order. A majority of the Court reasoned that
70. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
71. See id. at 320.
72. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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the President's power must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself. The Court found, in this case, that there
was no congressional act which supported the President's action. In
fact, the Court found that the Congress had specifically refused to
grant the President he emergency power to settle labor disputes
through seizures.7
3
The Court also rejected Truman's constitutional arguments. The
President's aggregate executive powers did not support the seizures;
rather, his actions were legislative in nature. The Court held that
the Constitution made it clear that the Congress had the sole law-
making power, and that the President is bound to execute the laws
passed by Congress under the Faithful Execution Clause. The fact
that other Presidents had seized domestic enterprises in order to set-
tle labor disputes did not strip the Congress of its exclusive legisla-
tive power.
Unlike the Curtiss-Wright case, in which the President acted
pursuant to express congressional delegation, Truman's actions in
the Youngstown case were in direct contravention of congressional
will, and involved actions that were primarily domestic in nature,
namely the seizure of domestic steel plants to support the production
of materials needed in the war effort in Korea. As suggested by Jus-
tice Jackson in his famous concurrence in the Youngstown case, the
president's power is at its lowest ebb when action is taken that is
"incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress," leav-
ing the President o rely only on his or her "own constitutional pow-
ers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."
74
The President's foreign affairs powers are, therefore, limited by the
Congress's powers in a variety of areas, as will be explored in more
detail below. But because most foreign affairs powers fall into Jus-
tice Jackson's second category - a "zone of twilight" in which the
President and Congress may have concurrent authority - assertions
of exclusive presidential control over foreign affairs, and concomitant
assertions of a congressional role in the formulation of foreign policy,
continue to characterize the struggle for control over the foreign pol-
icy of the United States.
C. The Treaty Power, Other International Agreements, and the
President's Role in the Development of Customary
International Law
The Constitution expressly empowers the President "by and with
the Advise and Consent of the Senate, to make 'treaties provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur."75 While the Constitution on
73. See id. at 585-86.
74. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
75. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
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its face only authorizes the President to enter into agreements with
foreign nations through the treaty power, three different modalities
through which international agreements are made by the United
States are supported by practice and affirmed by the courts: treaties,
congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements.
In addition, the President, as the sole representative of the United
States in foreign affairs, has a role in the progressive development of
customary international law.
The treaty-making power, as mentioned above, is the only
method of concluding international agreements expressly recognized
under the Constitution. Because the treaty-making power is an in-
herent aspect of nationhood and sovereignty, the subject of a treaty
may properly include any aspect of that sovereign power, subject only
to constitutional limitations.76 The Constitution itself does not limit
the subject of treaties to "matters of international concern," and as-
sertions to this effect have long been rejected.
77
As the sole representative of the United States in foreign affairs,
and through the exercise of the treaty power, the President appoints
and supervises the individuals who negotiate agreements with a for-
eign power. The President hen transmits the concluded treaty to the
Senate for approval. If the Senate approves the treaty by a two-
thirds vote, the President then ratifies it, and the treaty becomes
binding on the United States.
The constitutional consequences of concluding treaties through
the Article II process are numerous: The Constitution expressly pro-
vides that treaties concluded in this manner are the supreme law of
the land, binding not only on the federal government, but on the sev-
eral states as well.7 8 In addition, the judicial branch of the federal
government has the express power to review cases and controversies
that arise under treaties so concluded,79 and Congress can imple-
ment and enforce treaty obligations through the passage of "neces-
sary and proper" domestic legislation.
80
Under separation of powers principles, the Congress is normally
the sole legislative organ, with the President's role limited to recom-
mending legislation, and the signing or vetoing of laws passed by
Congress. In the area of international relations, however, the Consti-
tution gives the President primary law-making authority. The Presi-
dent was provided with the primary authority for a variety of
76. See infra Sec. VI.D.
77. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 302 Rep. Note 2 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement]. See also infra Sec. VI.D.
78. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The extent to which a treaty upon ratification, or
any other international agreement, is automatically binding as upreme law depends
on whether it is a "self-executing" agreement. See infra Sec. V.B.
79. U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1.
80. Id. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
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reasons. First, political theory and the example of British constitu-
tional practice at the time of the drafting of the Constitution sug-
gested that the power to bind the nation as a whole normally rested
in the chief executive power, such as the British crown. Moreover,
problems under the Articles of Confederation, where Congress had
the sole responsibility for negotiating and ratifying treaties, and the
need for "secrecy and dispatch" in diplomatic activities demonstrated
the need for the creation of an executive agent vested with the treaty-
making power."'
Although the Constitution only expressly authorizes the Presi-
dent to conclude treaties, the President often enters into agreements
with foreign nations without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
The validity of such executive agreements has been defended on the
basis of history, constitutional interpretation, and legal utilitarian-
ism.8 2 Some commentators argue that the Constitution expressly
recognizes the existence of international agreements other than trea-
ties when it provides that "No state shall, without the consent of Con-
gress ... enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or
with a foreign power."8 3 Regardless of whether the Constitution ex-
pressly or implicitly recognizes alternative modalities of creating in-
ternational agreements, executive agreements have been an accepted
method of lawmaking since the beginning of the republic.
Executive agreements generally fall into two categories: congres-
sional-executive agreements and sole executive agreements. Con-
gressional-executive agreements include international agreements
already concluded by the President which are submitted to both
Houses of Congress for a joint resolution by majority vote, rather
than by vote of two-thirds of the Senate only. They also include legis-
lation adopted by Congress that requires the President o conclude an
international agreement o execute the legislation, or that authorizes
the President o negotiate and conclude an agreement, or to ratify an
agreement already negotiated.
The potential scope of congressional-executive agreements in-
cludes anything within the constitutional power of the President and
the Congress, and because the federal government has plenary power
in foreign affairs, the scope of such power is very broad, subject only
to the same constitutional limitations that apply to treaties. More-
over, since a congressional-executive agreement can also be adopted
through the treaty-making process, it has been suggested that either
modality may be used, the choice depending merely on political con-
81. See The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay).
82. See "Note: Origins of the Executive Agreement," in Franck & Glennon, supra
n. 26, at 236.
83. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10. See McDougal & Lans, "Treaties and Congres-
sional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of Na-
tional Policy," 54 Yale L.J. 181 (1945).
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siderations, and that congressional-executive agreements have the
same binding effect as supreme law as treaties.
Congressional-executive agreements have been used with in-
creasing frequency for the conclusion of tariff and other trade agree-
ments. Their popularity in the trade area is probably due to the
recognition of the House of Representatives' special role as the origi-
nator of bills that propose raising of revenues.8 4 In addition, United
States trade law provides an example of the pre-authorization of ex-
ecutive agreements by Congress. For example, United States trade
law authorizes the President o make executive agreements to lower
tariffs with foreign nations.85 The decision to use the congressional-
executive agreement modality in international trade agreements re-
flects the recognition that successful policy in this area requires the
support and concurrence of both Houses of Congress, not just the
Senate.
The other modality available to the President for making inter-
national agreements is the sole executive agreement, also known as
presidential agreement. It is suggested that such agreements rest on
the President's sole plenary foreign affairs powers, such as the com-
mander-in-chief power or the power to recognize foreign nations.
However, the cases are ambiguous as to whether the President's au-
thority to conclude sole executive agreements derives solely because
of a history of Congressional acquiescence, or because Congress by its
silence implicitly authorizes Presidential activity in an area of con-
current authority. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,8 6 the
Supreme Court upheld an executive agreement hrough which Presi-
dent Carter settled claims against Iran arising from the Iranian hos-
tage incident. In upholding the Executive orders that implemented
the settlement, the Court noted both a history of implicit congres-
sional approval of the practice of claims settlement by sole executive
agreement, and a history of congressional acquiescence in the Presi-
dent's power to settle claims without the advice and consent of the
Senate, thereby demonstrating a "gloss" on executive power.
As the sole representative of the United States in international
affairs, the President also contributes to the process through which
customary international law is made. It is through the President
that the United States asserts claims against foreign nations, and it
is to the President hat foreign nations turn when asserting claims
against the United States. It is through the President hat authorita-
tive statements of United States policy are communicated to the in-
ternational community. The President can also waive the rights of
the United States, disregard international obligations, or conduct af-
84. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 7.
85. See 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988).
86. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
1994] 477
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
fairs in such way as to suggest the emergence of a new norm of cus-
tomary law. The President appoints and supervises United States
diplomats, such as the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
tions. Through each of these modalities and others, the President
contributes to the definition and exercise of international practice
necessary for the development of customary international law.
An example of the President's role in the development of custom-
ary law is illustrated by President Reagan's action regarding the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. After the Conven-
tion was adopted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the Reagan Administration decided not to
sign the treaty due to objections regarding provisions regulating the
mining of the deep sea-bed. However, President Reagan issued a
statement stating that many provisions of the treaty restated or clar-
ified the customary law in the area, or provided useful developments
of the law. Consequently, while the United States would not sign the
treaty, the Administration indicated that it would comply with vari-
ous aspects of the treaty including those relating to navigation and
overflight, and the recognition of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone.8 7 Those seeking to determine the content of the custom-
ary international law of the sea will turn to such authoritative
statements as evidence of state practice.
D. The War Power
The President does not have the authority to declare war; such
authority is expressly reserved to the Congress by the Constitution.88
The President, however, is designated as the commander-in-chief of
all United States forces.8 9 But because the lines between executive
and legislative power are not clearly established by the Constitution,
the constitutional scheme of shared war powers has long led to de-
bate about the proper roles of the President and Congress in the con-
duct of war.
The commander-in-chief power, read in conjunction with the Ex-
ecutive Power and Faithful Execution Clauses, has been used as a
basis for expanding the President's war powers justifying presiden-
tial authorization of military actions without the consent of Congress.
The first theory used to support the expansion of presidential war
powers was self-defense, that is, the President has the authority to
order defensive military action in response to actual aggression with-
out congressional approval. The self-defense theory was approved by
87. "President's Statement on United States Ocean Policy," 19 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 70-71 (March 14, 1983).
88. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8.
89. Id. art. II, sec. 2.
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the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases,90 where the Court affirmed
President Abraham Lincoln's order to blockade southern states with-
out a congressional declaration of war during the Civil War. In af-
firming the order, the Supreme Court ruled that while the President
did not have the power to initiate war, he did have the authority, if
not the duty, to respond to aggressions against the United States
without waiting for congressional action. The President has not only
the authority to determine if hostilities are sufficient to require a re-
sponse in self-defense, but also to determine the amount of force to be
used in repelling the attack.
Other theories supporting the expansion of presidential war pow-
ers include the neutrality theory - the President has the power to
authorize foreign military action to protect United States nationals
and property while remaining neutral in the conflict - and the
power to authorize military action pursuant to collective security re-
gimes such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the South East Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO). For example, President Theodore
Roosevelt relied on the neutrality theory to send troops into Panama
in 1903, even though the supposedly neutral troops were used to fight
the Colombian Army, and President Truman used the collective se-
curity theory to justify the United States military operations in Korea
as a "police action" under the United Nations.
But despite this seeming expansion of presidential power, do-
mestic political realities, particularly in light of the Vietnam War ex-
perience, have led more recent Presidents to seek congressional
approval before committing United States forces abroad, or to sup-
port the legality of their actions on general congressional authoriza-
tions. For example, President Bush sought and secured
congressional approval before committing United States troops to ac-
tual conflict in the recent Iraq-Kuwait war.9 1
Due to discontent over the President's ability to conduct informal
wars without congressional authority, the Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution9 2 in 1973 in order to restore what some believed
was the original balance of war powers intended by the Constitution.
As discussed below, there are questions about the War Power Resolu-
tion's constitutional legality.93 Nevertheless, it reaffirms the Presi-
dent's power to send troops into combat if the United States or its
territories are attacked.94 However, it also recognizes Congress's
shared responsibility by providing that the President "in every possi-
90. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
91. See Stromseth, "Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President and the
United Nations," 81 Geo. L.J. 597 (1993).
92. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-48 (1973).
93. See infra Sec. V.C.
94. 50 U.S.C. § 1542(c)(3).
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ble instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United
States Armed Forces into hostilities."
95
E. The Role of Executive Departments and Agencies in External
Affairs
Throughout most of the early history of the United States, the
executive branch remained relatively small. The President fulfilled
executive functions with the help of only a few executive departments
and agencies. However, the needs of modern governance in response
to the Great Depression of the 1930s led to an expansion of the execu-
tive branch and the rise of the so-called "Administrative state." From
the New Deal Era on, the federal bureaucracy has grown to its cur-
rent size, with many domestic executive departments and agencies
charged with implementing, under the supervision of the President,
an ever growing number of programs authorized by Congress.
The rise in the number of administrative agencies charged with
implementing domestic programs is paralleled by an increase in the
number of agencies dedicated to foreign affairs functions. The United
States Department of State, which was created in 1789 to serve as
the primary diplomatic organ of the United States, has steadily in-
creased in size in response to the United States growing importance
in international affairs.96 The War Department, the name of which
was changed to the Department of Defense after World War II, in-
creased in size as a result of America's expanding military involve-
ments and obligations throughout the world. In addition, a variety of
new agencies were created in the Twentieth Century devoted to inter-
national affairs: The National Security Council ("NSC") and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency ("CIA") were created in 1947 to oversee
international security interests. The Office of the United States
Trade Representative has played an integral role in conducting inter-
national trade relations in an era of ever increasing international eco-
nomic interdependence, while the Agency for International
Development ("AID") is the primary organ for the provision of foreign
aid. A number of agencies that are primarily engaged in domestic
affairs, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
have divisions devoted to aspects of international relations that fall
within their jurisdictions.
Despite the growth in the size and complexity of the United
States administrative state, the President retains control over the
function of the executive department, agencies, and councils, and re-
mains ultimately responsible for their conduct. In general, the Presi-
dent maintains control through the power to appoint and remove
95. Id. § 1543.
96. See Act of July 27, 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. 28. When originally established, the
Department of State was called the Department of Foreign Affairs.
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government officials. In addition, the President has more direct con-
trol over foreign affairs function by setting policy and designating
those officials that will act on behalf of the United States. For exam-
ple, while the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
among the United States, Mexico and Canada was negotiated by the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Trade Repre-
sentative was designated by the President, and subject to the Presi-
dent's direction.
In some cases, certain officials and organs of the United States
have the authority to conduct foreign relations with certain auton-
omy. For example, while the President has the authority to represent
the United States in treaty negotiations, that function is usually ex-
ercised by the Secretary of State, or other ambassadors and repre-
sentatives. Congress has also expressly given the power to conclude
agreements with foreign nations to certain agencies: the Postal Ser-
vice is authorized to conclude postal agreements with foreign na-
tions,97 and the American Institute on Taiwan has the power to make
agreements with Taiwan.98 However, in each of these cases the Pres-
ident still retains ultimate authority. The Secretary of State or other
ambassadors cannot conduct treaty negotiations without the provi-
sion of full powers by the President, and are ultimately subject to the
President's appointment and removal power. Both the Postal Service
and the American Institute can only conclude agreements with the
direction and consent of the President. So while executive depart-
ments and agencies play an important role in the conduct of Ameri-
can foreign affairs, the President remains the "sole representative" of
the United States in international affairs.
V. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A. Shared Competence of Congress in Foreign Affairs
Constitutional grants of foreign affairs powers to Congress
clearly establish Congress's role in the formation of United States for-
eign policy, making American foreign policy a shared responsibility of
the executive and legislative branches. What is less clear is the ex-
tent to which the President and Congress function as constitutional
equals in foreign affairs, or whether the President has the primary
responsibility with Congress acting only as a ratifier of presidential
initiatives. This question has served as the basis of a continuing con-
troversy between the President and Congress that has existed
throughout the history of the United States. But despite the contro-
versy, it is also clear that congressional participation is an important,
97. See 39 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
98. See 22 U.S.C. § 3305(b) (1988). See also Restatement, supra n. 77, § 303 Rep.
Note 10.
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and necessary, aspect of successful and effective foreign policy in the
United States.
The controversy has become more complicated in modern history
due to an expanding notion of foreign affairs in general. As the inter-
national community becomes increasingly interdependent in the eco-
nomic, social, environmental, human rights and other areas, the line
between international and domestic affairs has blurred. Many as-
pects of governance that were traditionally considered domestic in
nature now have international ramifications. On the other hand, re-
gional and global efforts are often required to solve domestic
problems, such as in the areas of trade and economy.
The Constitution specifically grants Congress certain foreign af-
fairs powers and does so in broad terms. Congress has the exclusive
power to regulate all foreign commerce,99 the power to provide for the
common defense,'00 and the power to "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offences against the law of
Nations."101 In addition, Congress has the power to declare war, to
make rules of war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,10 2 and to
raise, support, and regulate an army and navy.10 3 Moreover, the
Senate has a role in treaty making and the appointment of
ambassadors.1
04
These express grants of foreign affairs powers have been used to
support broad congressional action in the formation of American for-
eign policy. In particular, the commerce power has been an increas-
ingly important tool in the regulation and conduct of foreign affairs.
With the increasing importance of international business transac-
tions, and the growing interdependence of the world's economies,
Congress's exercise of the commerce power has a tremendous impact
on the development of United States foreign policy.
In addition to express grants of foreign affairs powers, the Con-
gress is also granted a variety of general legislative powers that have
an impact on foreign affairs, and from which expanded congressional
foreign affairs powers have been implied. The most important of
these powers is the power
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the... Powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.'05
99. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
100. Id. sec. 8, cl. 1.
101. Id. sec. 8, cl. 10.
102. Id. sec. 8, cl. 11.
103. Id. sec. 8, cls. 12, 13.
104. Id. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
105. Id. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
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The Necessary and Proper Clause impliedly requires the President o
seek congressional egislation to enact foreign policy, and the appro-
priations mechanism serves as an effective congressional check on
presidential foreign affairs powers. In addition, Congress's exclusive
and plenary power over admiralty and maritime matters is implied
from the exclusive grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to
the federal courts,106 as read in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the
power to adopt domestic legislation to implement treaties negotiated
and ratified pursuant to the treaty power.
Another important legislative power for the exercise of foreign
affairs is the spending power. The Constitution specifically grants
Congress the power to provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States.10 7 The spending power serves as the
basis not only for raising money for the national defense, but also for
the provision of foreign aid programs, an important aspect of modern
American foreign relations. Other Congressional powers that have
foreign affairs implications include the power to borrow money on the
credit of the United States,10 8 the power to establish uniform rules of
naturalization,10 9 the power to regulate the value of money,110 the
postal power,1 ' and the investigatory power.
Beyond these express and implied grants of foreign affairs pow-
ers, the Congress has a constitutionally implied power to regulate for-
eign affairs. The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of this broad,
implied power in Perez v. Brownell,i1 2 a case which involved Con-
gress's power to pass legislation that would have the effect of revok-
ing United States citizenship of an American citizen who voted in a
foreign election. While the exact holding of the case was later over-
ruled, the Court's conclusion that the Congress has the authority to
legislate in foreign affairs matters has not been questioned. In hold-
ing that Congress acted within its foreign affairs powers, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
[W]hat is the source of power on which Congress must be
assumed to have drawn? Although there is in the Constitu-
tion no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legisla-
tion for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can
be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making
organ of the nation .... [A] federal Government to conduct
106. Id. art. III, sec. 2.
107. Id. art. II, sec. 8, cl. 1.
108. Id. sec. 8, c. 2.
109. Id. sec. 8, ci. 4.
110. Id. sec. 8, cl. 5.
111. Id. sec. 8, cl. 7.
112. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled on other grounds Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967).
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the affairs of that nation must be held to have granted that
Government the powers indispensable to its sovereign func-
tioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations. The
Government must be able not only to deal affirmatively with
foreign nations ... [i]t must also be able to reduce to a mini-
mum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sover-
eigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and
interest.'13
Justice Sutherland expressed similar reasoning in the Curtiss-
Wright 1 4 case. According to Justice Sutherland, the United States
possesses a "foreign affairs power" that is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. Congress's implied power to regulate foreign affairs is
the legislative component of United States sovereignty.
The exact scope of Congress's inherent foreign affairs power has
not been settled. However, as with other exercises of congressional
power, the Congress is limited by grants of foreign affairs powers to
the other branches of the federal government, and by other constitu-
tional limitations protecting individual rights.
B. The Treaty Power
One area of international relations where the Congress has both
an express and implied role is in the making of international agree-
ments. The degree and modality of Congressional participation in in-
ternational law-making depends on what type of agreement is being
considered: a treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, or a sole
executive agreement.
The Constitution gives the Senate an express role in the process
of treat adoption. It specifically provides that the President makes a
treaty by ratifying or acceding to it only after the two-thirds of the
Senate gives its consent.115 While Senate consent is required before
the President can ratify a treaty, the President is under no obligation
to ratify once the Senate has given its consent. The President retains
complete discretion over the decision to "make" treaties, and the Sen-
ate cannot force a President who does not wish to to ratify a treaty.
1 16
The Senate cannot amend or enter reservations to a treaty nego-
tiated by the President. It can, however, condition its consent on
modifications or reservations, or on a certain interpretation of the
treaty's meaning. The President can ignore such conditions, but can-
not proceed to ratify the treaty until such conditions are met."
17
113. Id. at 57.
114. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
711, 713 (1893).
115. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
116. See Restatement, supra n. 77 § 303 Comment d.
117. See id.
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The Constitution also provides that the President may make
treaties with the "advice and consent" of the Senate. It has been ac-
knowledged, however, that Senate "advice," as distinguished from its
"consent," is not a necessary component of treaty negotiation. At the
time the Constitution was drafted, the drafters probably envisioned a
Senate role whereby the Senate, which at that time would only be
twenty-six Senators, would serve as a type of advisory council, con-
sulting with the President as a treaty was negotiated.118 No Presi-
dent ever used the Senate in this role, and the Senate since
acquiesced, particularly when the number of Senators began to grow
as the nation expanded.
Both houses of Congress have a role in the adoption of congres-
sional-executive agreements. Because a congressional-executive
agreement requires congressional egislation at some point, both the
House and the Senate have to adopt that legislation by majority vote
before the agreement can become law. The Senate does not have to
adopt the agreement by a two-thirds majority, as when it gives con-
sent to a treaty, perhaps making it easier to obtain Senate approval.
This is offset by the fact that a House majority must also be obtained,
which may be especially important for agreements in areas where the
House has the power to originate legislation.
Sole executive agreements, being based on the President's ple-
nary foreign affairs powers, by their nature do not need congressional
authorization before they become binding, and therefore, there is the-
oretically no Congressional role. Questions of whether the President
can make an agreement inconsistent with an act of Congress, or
whether Congress can adopt legislation regulating sole executive
agreements have not been authoritatively settled.119
Treaties adopted pursuant to constitutional procedures are given
the same status as domestic legislation. The Constitution provides
that treaties, as well as federal statutes, are the supreme law of the
land, binding on the States. Theoretically, every treaty ratified with
the consent of the Senate is supreme law. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, recognizes that some treaties, non-self-executing treaties, do
not automatically have this authoritative effect. A non-self-executing
treaty, such as a treaty that is more in the nature of a contract be-
tween two nations, where one party engages to perform an act, re-
quires domestic legislation before it becomes binding.120 A self-
executing agreement, on the other hand, automatically becomes bind-
ing law upon ratification.
118. See Bestor, "Advice from the Very Beginning, 'Consent' when the End is
Achieved," in Foreign Affairs, supra n. 26, at 6.
119. See Restatement, supra n. 77, § 303 Comments i, j.
120. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888).
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When a self-executing treaty conflicts with a prior act of Con-
gress, the later in time prevails.121 The Supreme Court has held that
treaties and legislation have equal constitutional status; both are the
supreme law of the land. Consequently, a valid legislative act by
Congress can also modify, amend or abrogate a treaty.122 However,
as a matter of statutory construction, an act of Congress and a valid
treaty will be interpreted in such a way as to give them both effect,
unless the language of either would be violated and Congress's intent
to modify the treaty is clearly expressed.123 If Congress decides to
abrogate a treaty, however, the United States remains bound by its
treaty obligations, and would be subject to claims for treaty default
under international law.
124
Although the constitution is silent about executive agreements,
and says nothing about their supremacy, the courts have held that
valid executive agreements are supreme over state laws and policies.
In United States v. Pink,125 a New York state court refused to recog-
nize the United States government's title to New York insurance as-
sets formerly owned by the Russians. President Roosevelt had
concluded the Litvinov Assignment by sole executive agreement with
the Soviet government, which had the effect of assigning the foreign
assets of nationalized Russian insurance businesses to the United
States. The Supreme Court held that because the Litvinov Assign-
ment was concluded pursuant to the President's ole power to recog-
nize foreign government, it had the same status as treaties, and
therefore prevailed over state policy. New York state's policy against
recognition of the Soviet Government and the assignment of property
violated the executive agreement, and therefore was invalid in the
face of supreme federal law. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,126 the
Supreme Court upheld the supremacy of executive agreements over
state law when it affirmed the constitutionality of an executive order
settling claims against Iranian assets in the United States that had
arisen in connection with the Iranian hostage incident. The validity
of the agreement was based on the President's power to settle foreign
claims, the exercise of which the Congress had long since acquiesced
in.
While executive agreements are clearly supreme law in relation
to state laws, the status of executive agreements vis-a-vis inconsis-
tent federal law is less clear. In United States v. Guy W. Capps,
121. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
122. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion
Case).
123. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; see also Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 22, at 214-
15.
124. See Restatement, supra n. 77, § 115(1)(b).
125. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
126. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Inc.,127 the Court of Appeals ruled that an executive agreement was
invalid in the face of conflicting federal legislation because the Presi-
dent improperly exercised powers delegated to him by earlier con-
gressional act. While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on
the issue, the Capps case suggests that some executive agreements
are not equal in all respects to federal legislation. It is likely, for ex-
ample, that a sole executive agreement, entered into by the President
based on the executive's sole foreign affairs powers, would be
supreme over conflicting state law, but not over an inconsistent fed-
eral statute.
C. The War Power
The vesting of war powers in both the President and Congress
has led to conflicts about which branch has the dominant authority.
Congress often claims to have the dominant role in the exercise of
war powers based on its constitutionally delegated powers to declare
war, to make the rules of warfare, and to make all laws necessary
and proper to execute the war power.128 In addition, Congress bases
its claim on its power to tax and finance defense programs,129 and to
raise and support the armed forces, although appropriations for the
armed forces cannot be for a longer term than two years.
130
In spite of the express vesting of the power to declare war in the
Congress, Presidents have often committed United States armed
forces in foreign conflicts without a congressional declaration of war,
based on the executive power to defend American interests abroad.
Growing objections to this presidential exercise of power, especially
after the Vietnam War, led the Congress to adopt the War Powers
Resolution13 ' over presidential veto in 1973. Section 1 of the War
Powers Resolution states that its purpose was
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the
United States and insure the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situa-
tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly in-
dicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
132
The term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" is defined to
include the assignment of military commanders and planners, and
participation in the regular or irregular forces of a foreign govern-
127. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
128. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8.
129. Id. sec. 8, cl. 1.
130. Id. sec. 8, cl. 12.
131. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
132. Id. § 1542(a).
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ment engaged in hostilities or in circumstances where hostilities are
imminent.13
3
The War Powers Resolution purports to subject the presidential
commitment of armed forces to congressional control, although it
does expressly provide for an exception if the United States is at-
tacked.134 The President is required to report to Congress within
forty-eight hours of introducing armed forces into a conflict. 135 Con-
gress then has sixty days to declare war or extend the sixty day pe-
riod, otherwise the President must withdraw the armed forces.
136
Moreover, the Congress retains the authority to direct the President
to withdraw troops, even within the sixty-day period, by concurrent
resolution of the House and the Senate.
37
The application of the War Powers Resolution raises a variety of
questions. It has been argued that the Resolution improperly in-
fringes upon the President's power as commander-in-chief. More-
over, the provision allowing the Congress to recall United States
forces by concurrent resolution without presentation of the resolution
for signature by the President may be an unconstitutional egislative
veto in light of INS v. Chadha.138 On the other hand, Justice Jack-
son's concurrence in The Steel Seizure case suggests that the Presi-
dent's power in this area is at its lowest ebb in the face of
congressional action. This dispute may never be judicially resolved,
however, because it is the sort of inter-branch struggle subject to the
courts' political question doctrine.
In addition to questions regarding the separation of powers in
the introduction of troops in foreign conflicts, the proper scope of the
war powers has given rise to other tensions between the President
and Congress. The Steel Seizure'39 case provides an example of the
struggle between the President and Congress regarding emergency
economic powers during war. President Truman had attempted to
seize the domestic steel industry by executive order, claiming emer-
gency powers during war based on the President's commander-in-
chief power and on his general executive powers. The Supreme Court
invalidated the order as an unconstitutional exercise of power in the
face of contrary congressional egislation. The Court noted that the
President's power must stem from either an act of Congress or the
Constitution. The President had no statutory authority for seizing
the plants; Congress had in fact expressly rejected plant seizure as a
method for preventing strikes. Moreover, the action did not fall
133. Id. § 1548(c).
134. Id. § 1542(c)(3).
135. Id. § 1544.
136. Id. § 1545(b).
137. Id. § 1545(c).
138. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
139. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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within the President's commander-in-chief power. Distinghing cases
upholding broad powers for military commanders, the Court held:
Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater
of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithful-
ness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such
to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Na-
tion's law-makers, not for its military authorities.
140
In other words, it is the role of Congress to make domestic laws, not
the Executive.
In contrast to the President's power over the domestic economy
during war, the Congress's power is very broad. The Supreme Court,
in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. ,141 held that Congress's power to reg-
ulate war included the power not only to regulate domestic economic
affairs during hostilities, such as the imposition of rent control, but
the power continues even after hostilities have terminated, or until
the emergency has ended.
Another source of conflict over the exercise of the war powers be-
tween the President and Congress relates to Congress's "power of the
purse." The Constitution expressly provides that Congress has the
sole power to appropriate funds from the United States treasury.
Moreover, the Congress is expressly vested the power to "raise and
support" an army and to provide for and maintain a navy. This sepa-
ration of the appropriations power was intended to prevent the
branch of government responsible for executing the laws from having
direct access to the source of funding, and in the case of the armed
forces, to separate the commander of the forces from the means to
support them independently, thereby giving the Congress an effective
check on the expansion of executive power. Congress's supremacy
over the purse has been acknowledged by Presidents from the begin-
ning of the republic: both Presidents Jefferson and Jackson in the
face of threatened aggression from Spain and by South American pi-
rates, respectively, recognized that Congress had exclusive control
over the means necessary to carry out military efforts. President
Nixon acknowledged Congress's power over funding for the Vietnam
War, even as he continued to step up the prosecution of that war.
The extent to which Congress can control the President through
the power of the purse is unclear. There is some evidence that at
least some of the founders believed that the President had inherent
emergency spending powers, the exercise of which must be affirmed
by Congress at the earliest opportunity. Others have suggested that
the President, even in the face of a cut-off of funds by the Congress,
140. Id. at 587.
141. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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may continue an operation with funds already appropriated. How-
ever, this question has never been specifically answered.142 Even
during the Iran-contra affair, while some of President Reagan's staff
believed the Boland Amendment, which cut off all funding for the
Nicaraguan contras, was an unconstitutional infringement of the
President's foreign affairs powers, the crisis only involved the use of
funds independently raised from the sale of arms to Iran rather than
funds appropriated by Congress.
United Nations enforcement action, adopted pursuant to a reso-
lution of the United Nations Security Council, might also serve as a
source of tension between the President and Congress over the proper
exercise of the war power. The question is whether the President has
the power to commit United States armed forces to an international
police action pursuant to a Security Council resolution without first
seeking a Congressional declaration of war.143 One theory on which
such a power might be based is that in giving consent to the United
Nations Charter, the Senate impliedly consented to any future en-
forcement action. However, given that agreements between the
United Nations and the United States regarding the provision of mili-
tary forces pursuant to United Nations Charter Article 43, which
would require Senate consent, have never been negotiated, this the-
ory appears unpersuasive. Furthermore, actual practice during the
Iraq-Kuwait War, where President Bush sought congressional ap-
proval before committing troops to actual hostilities, suggests that
the President, in the absence of a prior agreement negotiated be-
tween the United States and the United Nations and confirmed by
the Senate, should seek congressional approval before prosecuting
an international enforcement action.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A. The Place of the Judiciary within the Constitutional System of
Government of the United States
The judicial power of the federal government of the United
States is vested in the United States Supreme Court and the other
lower federal courts established by act of Congress.'44 The constitu-
tional role of the Supreme Court in the federal system is set out in
Article III of the Constitution:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, . . . arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author-
142. See generally the materials set out in Franck & Glennon, supra n. 26, at 663-
84.
143. See Stromseth, supra n. 91; Glennon, supra n. 29.
144. U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 1.
490
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ity;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-be-
tween Citizens of different States; ... and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
145
Although the Constitution is silent about the availability of judicial
review by the Supreme Court of acts of the other branches of the fed-
eral government, judicial review of acts of state or local governments,
and the scope of such review, it has been firmly established as a mat-
ter of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has the power to
review the acts of the other organs of government in the United
States, and declare those acts unconstitutional. As a result, the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, through the exercise of
judicial review, have contributed to the evolving nature of the Consti-
tution. By interpreting and applying the Constitution to "cases or
controversies," the federal courts have given meaning to the often
broad language of constitutional provisions, and developed constitu-
tional doctrines to deal with the problems that confronted a growing
and expanding nation. Through the power of judicial review, consti-
tutional provisions and doctrines have been adapted and modified to
address issues that never could have been foreseen by the framers,
keeping the Constitution a vital and "living" document right up to the
present day.
The power of judicial review of the other branches of the federal
government was established by Chief Justice John Marshall in the
landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.146 At the end of the Eight-
eenth Century, growing discontent with the federal government dom-
inated by the Federalist Party led to the defeat of the Federalist
President John Adams, and the election of the third President,
Thomas Jefferson, an anti-federalist and the founder of the Demo-
cratic-Republican Party (now called the Democratic Party). In the
waning hours of President Adams's term, in an attempt to pack the
federal government with other Federalists, President Adams made a
145. Id. sec. 2, c. 1-2.
146. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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series of "midnight" appointments. Among them was the appoint-
ment of John Marshall to be the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the appointment of Federalists to newly-created circuit
court judgeships. The final act of the Adams administration was to
appoint several justices of the peace to serve five-year terms in the
District of Columbia and Alexandria. However, some of the commis-
sions were never actually delivered to the individuals appointed
while Adams was still in office, and once Thomas Jefferson assumed
the Presidency, he refused to deliver them.
One such individual, William Marbury, brought suit against the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, in the Supreme Court to
compel delivery of his commission. Chief Justice Marshall used the
case as a vehicle to assert the Court's power to review the acts of the
other branches of the federal government. After finding that Mar-
bury had a vested right to the commission, Justice Marshall turned
first to the question of whether the law provided Marbury with a
remedy. Justice Marshall maintained that it is the "essence of civil
liberty" that a legal remedy be available for a legal wrong. Since the
government of the United States is one of "laws and not of men," it
must grant a remedy for legal wrongs.147 He conceded that some
acts, which are political in nature, or left to the discretion of the Exec-
utive, are only politically reviewable, and not subject to judicial re-
view. However, if the Executive is assigned a specific duty by law, it
cannot disregard such a duty. In this case, the President was under a
legal duty to deliver the commissions. Therefore, Marbury was enti-
tled to a remedy under the law.
After finding that Marbury was entitled to a remedy, Marshall
noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided him with one, namely a
writ of mandamus. Justice Marshall then turned to the question of
whether the Constitution allowed the Supreme Court to issue the
writ. In the key part of the decision, Justice Marshall found that a
writ of mandamus can only be issued from a court with original juris-
diction. Because the Constitution only provides for original jurisdic-
tion in cases affecting ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and in
cases in which a state is a party, the Supreme Court could not issue
the writ in this case, which involved a justice of the peace. Therefore,
the Judiciary Act, which provided the remedy, was in conflict with
the Constitution.
To resolve the conflict, Justice Marshall held that a legislative
act contrary to the Constitution was not a law. His reasoning was
deceptively simple: The people of the United States established a gov-
ernment of limited powers by adopting the Constitution. The limita-
tions on government incorporated in the written Constitution would
be lost if the Constitution does not control unconstitutional acts.
147. Id. at 163.
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Therefore, the Constitution is superior to inconsistent acts of Con-
gress, and unconstitutional acts are invalid.
Justice Marshall then went one step further to hold that "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.' 14 An inability to reject laws in favor of the Consti-
tution would subvert the very nature of a written constitution.
Therefore, if the Court is given the choice between the Constitution
and an inconsistent act of Congress, it is the Court's duty to apply
the Constitution, and strike down the act of Congress as
unconstitutional.
Through this logic, Justice Marshall established the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation,
and laid the cornerstone for judicial review of acts of the Executive
and Congress which survives to this day. Indeed, much of Justice
Marshall's reasoning is subject to criticism.149 President Jefferson
himself disagreed with the Court, but because the case ultimately
went in his favor - Marbury being denied the writ of mandamus -
the case went unchallenged. The decision in Marbury is considered
to be Justice Marshall's "master stroke" - by giving the new Presi-
dent what he wanted, Justice Marshall was able to assert an impor-
tant power for the Court, and thereby establish a key role for the
Court in the constitutional system of government.
In a series of early cases, the Supreme Court also established its
power to review the acts of state and local governments. One such
case, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,150 involved a conflict between a
treaty and a state law. Hunter claimed title to land in northern Vir-
ginia pursuant to a grant by the state. Virginia had earlier passed an
act confiscating the land of individuals who were British citizens or
loyalists during the Revolutionary War. Martin, a British citizen
who inherited the land from his uncle Lord Fairfax, a British subject
who had become a citizen of Virginia before he died, claimed title to
the same land pursuant to a treaty between the United States and
Great Britain. Martin lost his case in the Virginia Court of Appeals,
and appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Because the Con-
stitution makes treaties supreme law over state law, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Virginia court with orders to enter
judgment for Martin. The Virginia court refused, denying that the
federal court had the power to order a state court.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it had
the power to review state court actions. In an opinion by Justice
Story (Chief Justice Marshall had recused himself from the case due
to his involvement as Secretary of State in negotiating the treaty and
148. Id. at 177.
149. See e.g., Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 22, at 6-10.
150. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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his ownership of land that might be affected by the decision), the
Court ruled that the Constitution gave the Court jurisdiction over all
cases arising under the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties,
and this jurisdiction included appellate review of state court cases.
Because the Supremacy Clause makes treaties the supreme law of
the land, state court judges are bound to apply them. Because the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the federal con-
stitution, statutes, and treaties, state courts are bound by its rulings,
thereby ensuring the uniformity of federal law.
The long-term significance of judicial review cannot be overem-
phasized. It has provided the federal courts with a key role in enforc-
ing limits on the political branches of government and protecting
individual rights in the face of majoritarian excesses. In the latter
part of the Nineteenth Century, the courts used the power of judicial
review to strike down economic regulations that impaired the "liberty
of contract." In the Twentieth Century, the courts retreated from
their enforcement of economic rights, focusing instead on important
individual liberties such as the freedom of speech and the press, the
right to due process of law, and the right of equal protection of the
law. As noted by Alexis de Tocqueville, almost every political and
social issue is eventually litigated in the United States.151 Judicial
review makes this possible, with the courts often serving as the last
refuge for people unable to secure their rights through the political
processes, whether federal, state or local. As a result, the Supreme
Court has often been at the center of important social movements, as
exemplified by the Civil Rights cases of the 1950s and 1960s, and the
battle over abortion rights today.
The availability of judicial review helps to ensure the pervasive-
ness of the rule of law in the United States. It has often been said
that in the United States, no one is above the law. The use of the
courts by individuals challenging the acts of presidents and the gov-
ernment has contributed to the reality of this principle.
The willingness of the federal courts to review the acts of other
organs of American government in the domestic realm, is tempered
somewhat in the realm of foreign affairs. The courts have been hesi-
tant to exercise judicial review in cases involving the President's and
Congress's foreign affairs powers for reasons that will be discussed in
more detail below. However, judicial review is still available in the
foreign affairs arena, and the courts have occasionally exercised that
power to resolve important disputes.
151. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 99-105 (G. Lawrence, trans., J.
Mayer ed. 1969).
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B. The Doctrine of Political Questions (Non-Justiciability)
Despite the broad scope of the power of judicial review, there are
some limits on its exercise. Some limits are constitutional, including
standing,15 2 ripeness,153 and mootness.154 Moreover, the courts are
constitutionally prevented from issuing advisory opinions.1 55
There are also jurisprudential, or judge-made, limits on judicial
review. The most significant of these in the foreign affairs area is the
doctrine of political questions. The term "political question" has been
used in two quite different contexts. In the first, the court makes a
finding that the question before it has been constitutionally allocated
to another branch of government, applies the appropriate standard,
and generally finds the action constitutional. In this sense, the court
does not actually hold that the case is non-justiciable; rather, it de-
fers to the other coordinate branch of government. In the second con-
text, the court will actually hold that a case is non-justiciable, or
incapable of judicial resolution. This sense of the political question
doctrine is invoked when obtainable evidence is lacking, when the
court finds it difficult to craft manageable standards, or out of judi-
cial prudence.
In the case of Baker v. Carr,156 Justice Brennan gave a definition
of when a case involves a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a polit-
ical question is found a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; ... or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
157
152. Chief Justice Warren described the standing doctrine as being a question of
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request
the adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justi-
ciable ... the emphasis ... is on whether the party invoking federal court
jurisdiction 'has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' and
whether the dispute touches upon 'legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests.'
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968). See also Monaghan, "Constitutional Adju-
dication: The Who and When," 82 Yale L.J. 1363 (1973).
153. The ripeness doctrine prevents the courts from hearing cases prior to the
existence of a fully-developed case or controversy worthy of judicial review. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127-29 (1973); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
154. The mootness doctrine requires that a genuince controversy remain 'alive"
from the time the complaint is filed until its final disposition by the Supreme Court.
See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See also "Note, The Mootness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court," 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1974).
155. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 22, at 54-58.
156. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), on remand 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
157. Id. at 217.
1994] 495
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Justice Brennan noted that the area of foreign affairs often fits
within the political question doctrine because the issues involve stan-
dards that defy judicial application, the exercise of discretion commit-
ted to the executive or legislative branch, or questions that require
the single-voiced statement of the government. However, Justice
Brennan also noted that the political question doctrine will not pre-
vent judicial review when the executive and legislative branches have
failed to act.
The political question doctrine has been invoked by the courts to
avoid ruling on questions regarding the conduct of foreign relations,
or the making and conduct of hostilities. 158 In spite of these cases, no
good definition of when a case presents a political question has been
formulated, and there is debate over what a political question really
is. Moreover, while the doctrine is available, the courts, perhaps in
an attempt to maintain independence from the other branches, rarely
invoke the doctrine to abstain from deciding foreign affairs cases, pre-
ferring instead to review the actions of the executive and legislative
branches and to find that they acted within their constitutional
powers. 159
C. Judicial Review Regarding Foreign Affairs in General
While the Constitution vests the bulk of foreign affairs powers in
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, it
also provides for a significant and important role for the judicial
branch. The constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts
includes the power over cases arising under treaties, cases affecting
ambassadors, cases to which the United States is a party, and cases
between United States citizens and foreign states.
These provisions have served as the basis for the Supreme
Court's exercise of jurisdiction over cases involving foreign nations,
suits by United States citizens against foreign nationals and diplo-
mats, and cases involving the interpretation and application of treaty
provisions. In addition, the Court's power to review cases arising
under the laws of the United States provides a basis for reviewing
domestic legislation implementing treaty obligations.
Through the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has es-
tablished its jurisdiction over issues arising from the application of
international agreements other than treaties. In B. Altman & Co. v.
United States,160 the Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to
158. See infra Sec. VI.G.
159. For a criticism of the political question doctine in the context of foreign affairs
disputes, see Charney, "Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations," in Foreign Affairs,
supra n. 26, at 98; Glennon, "Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine," in
id. at 107; Henkin, "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?," 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976).
160. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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review an appeal regarding a congressional-executive agreement. In
construing the Judiciary Act of 1891, which provided for the direct
appeal of a lower federal court judgment to the Supreme Court in
"any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the United
States or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its
authority is drawn into question," the Court reasoned that a congres-
sional-executive agreement, although not technically a treaty subject
to formal Senate ratification, was nevertheless the type of "interna-
tional compact, negotiated between representatives of two sovereign
nations and made in the name and on the behalf of the contracting
countries" that Congress intended to include in the Act. And while
the B. Altman case involved a congressional-executive agreement, its
logic would apparently apply to sole executive agreements as well.
It is also well established that the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under customary international law. In the Pa-
quete Habana,161 the Supreme Court held:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate ju-
risdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination.
Moreover, it has been suggested that the constitutional authority of
the Congress to define and punish international law violations im-
pliedly incorporates international law into United States law.162 Be-
cause the courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under United
States law, their jurisdiction therefore includes the power to ascer-
tain and apply international law.
Exercising the power of judicial review over cases involving trea-
ties, other international agreements, and customary international
law, the courts have established a variety of rules regarding the sta-
tus, determination and interpretation of international law and agree-
ments. In general, international law and agreements are federal law.
As a consequence, the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of United
States law, has conclusive authority to determine and interpret inter-
national law for all courts in the United States, whether federal or
state. The need for national uniformity in the application of interna-
tional law also suggests that state courts should follow the rulings of
lower federal courts as a matter of deference. The determination and
interpretation of the content of international law or agreements is a
question of law and subject to judicial notice without any special
pleading or proof requirements.163 However, judges often rely on ex-
pert witnesses and other relevant evidence to aid in determining the
content of customary international law.
161. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
162. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.
163. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708.
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As a matter of construction, courts attempt to avoid interpreting
federal statutes in such a way as to conflict with international law or
agreements. Chief Justice Marshall noted that "an Act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."164 In numerous cases, the Court has
applied this principle to avoid conflicts between federal statutes and
earlier treaty provisions. When there is a conflict between an inter-
national agreement and a federal statute, the courts have crafted a
variety of doctrines to help resolve such conflicts, such as the Last in
Time Doctrine.165 Judicial resolution of conflicts between federal law
and customary international law is discussed below. 166
D. Judicial Review of Matters Involving the Formation,
Interpretation, and Application of International
Agreements
Other than constitutional limitations, or limitations imposed by
international law, there are no limits to the subject matter of treaties
or international agreements, and the courts have not imposed any
such limits of their own. At one time it was suggested that the
United States can only enter into treaties dealing with matters of "in-
ternational concern."167 This view, however, has been rejected, and
the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of treaties concluded on a
variety of "domestic" subjects, such as the rights of inheritance in
land168 or the regulation of migratory birds.16 9 Apparently, the only
requirement for the formation of a valid treaty is that it must be a
bona fide international act entered into with one or more foreign pow-
ers, although the Supreme Court has never invalidated a treaty on
these grounds.1
70
In the interpretation of treaties and other international agree-
ments, the judicial branch gives "great weight" to initial interpreta-
tions by the Executive.171 But because treaties and international
agreements are part of United States law, and the Supreme Court is
the final arbiter of United States law, the Supreme Court has the
final authority to interpret international agreements. The Court has
held that treaty interpretation is not a political question, and gener-
164. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
165. See supra Sec. V.B.
166. See infra Sec. VI.F.
167. See Statement by Charles Evans Hughes, 23 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 194-96
(1929).
168. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
169. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
170. See Restatement, supra n. 77, § 302 Rep. Notes 2.
171. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968).
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ally, the courts will not decline to hear such cases.172 Consequently,
the courts employ a variety of tools in treaty interpretation to ascer-
tain the meaning of treaty provisions including interpretation of the
plain meaning of treaty terms, recourse to travaux prdparatoires, and
analysis of relevant congressional materials developed during treaty
ratification. Moreover, because customary international law is fed-
eral law, the international rules of treaty interpretation, to the extent
that they have become binding customary law, would also be binding
on United States courts.'
7 3
International agreements duly concluded by the federal govern-
ment are capable of application in United States courts, and can be
the source of individual rights and remedies in individual cases. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that treaties are the
supreme law of the land.'74 In theory, treaties negotiated by the
President, consented to by two-thirds of the Senate, and subse-
quently ratified by the President are equivalent to other federal laws,
and are capable of direct application by federal and state courts with-
out any further congressional action. The Supreme Court has deter-
mined, however, that neither all treaties, nor all treaty provisions,
automatically have such legally binding authority. The courts make
a distinction between self-executing treaties -or treaty provisions,
which are automatically capable of application in the courts, and non-
self-executing treaties or treaty provisions, which require an addi-
tional act of Congress before they can be enforced in the courts.
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
agreements was recognized early on by Chief Justice John Marshall.
In the case of Foster v. Neilson,175 Justice Marshall wrote:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, wherever it operates
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract,
before it can become a rule for the court.
17 6
Likewise, in The Head Money Cases,177 the Supreme Court held:
172. Similarly, the Court has held that the interpretation of statutes, even if they
involve foreign affairs, are not political questions, and are therefore justiciable. See
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
173. See Restatement, supra n. 77, § 325 and Comments.
174. See U.S. Const. art. VI.
175. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1828).
176. Id. at 314.
177. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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A treaty is primarily a compact between independent na-
tions. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties
to it .... But a treaty may also contain provisions which
confer rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the na-
tions residing in the territorial limits of the other, which par-
take of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country .... A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of
Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined.
178
Whether an international agreement is self-executing depends, gen-
erally, on the intent of the parties as determined from the treaty pro-
vision itself. If the treaty is uncertain, then the courts determine
intent by considering a variety of factors, including:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole;
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the na-
ture of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mech-
anisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private cause of
action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the
dispute.179
Applying these principles, the courts have held a variety of inter-
national agreements to be self-executing. The most common self-exe-
cuting treaties include treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, and agreements conferring rights on foreign nationals,
such as treaties protecting foreign creditors from cancellations of
their debts,180 treaties ensuring inheritance rights,'8 ' and extradi-
tion treaties.'8 2 In contrast, international agreements in the human
rights area have been held to be non-self-executing. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, held
that the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords are not self-
executing because the provisions of the treaty "contemplate further
action by the participating states" to carry them out.'8 3 Similarly,
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
178. Id. at 598-99.
179. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985), citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); People of Saipan v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Sei
Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
180. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
181. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
183. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 375-76.
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gees,184 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as an inter-
national agreement, are considered non-self-executing.'8 5 The
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter have also
been declared non-self-executing,'8 6 although the Charter provisions
requiring compliance with United Nations Security Council resolu-
tion have been held to be self-executing.1
8 7
The power to terminate treaties and international agreements is
not provided for in the Constitution. Consequently, the courts, exer-
cising judicial review, could in theory settle the issue. However,
there is no authoritative ruling on the subject. The closest the
Supreme Court has come to ruling on each branch's power to termi-
nate treaties came in the case of Goldwater v. Carter.188 In this case,
a number of Senators and House Representatives challenged Presi-
dent Carter's plan to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan,
and recognize the People's Republic of China as the government of
China. The Supreme Court, without opinion, ordered a lower federal
court to dismiss the case. A statement concurred in by four justices
declared the controversy to be a non-justiciable political question be-
cause it involved the President's authority in the conduct of foreign
affairs and the extent to which Congress could check presidential ac-
tion. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, while rejecting the major-
ity's interpretation of the political question doctrine, indicated he
would not review the decision to terminate the treaty because
it rested on the President's sole power to recognize foreign
governments.
Only Justice Powell rejected the political question doctrine en-
tirely in this case. He concurred in the judgment because he believed
the question was not yet ripe (Congress had not adopted legislation
contrary to the President's decision). He suggested, however, that if
Congress did adopt a conflicting resolution, the Court could settle the
conflict by exercising its power to interpret the Constitution. To date,
no such action has taken place, and there are no further judicial rul-
ings on treaty termination.
E. Judicial Review of So-Called "Unconstitutional" Treaties and
International Agreements
When exercising its power of judicial review, the judicial branch
of the federal government has often employed the first ten amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, also known as the Bill of
Rights, as a limit on the power of the executive and legislative
184. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982).
185. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985)
citing In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
186. See, e.g., Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373-75.
187. See United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
188. 444 U.S. 997 (1979).
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branches. The constitutional scheme assures that the federal govern-
ment will be subject to the will of the majority of its citizens by pro-
viding for direct election of legislators, both Representatives and
Senators, and the President and the Vice-President.18 9 In recogni-
tion, however, that abuse of power by a majority can lead to the "tyr-
anny of the majority," the Bill of Rights guarantees individual rights
by denying certain powers to the federal government. While the fed-
eral court system has often been criticized as being an anti-demo-
cratic institution (judges in the federal court system are appointed for
life by the President; they are not elected, and can only be removed by
impeachment'90 ), the relative independence of federal judges from
the political process has often placed them in a unique position to
uphold and enforce the Bill of Rights as a limit, thereby protecting
the human rights of minorities against power abuses by the majority.
The Bill of Rights is no less a limitation on the power of the fed-
eral government in the foreign affairs realm than it is in the domes-
tic. Consequently, while the treaty power is generally construed to be
very broad, its exercise is still subject to the constitutional limits of
the Bill of Rights and other constitutional constraints. As Justice
Field stated in his famous dicta in Geofroy v. Riggs:191
That the treaty power of the United States extends to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
the governments of other nations, is clear .... The treaty
power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlim-
ited except by those restraints which are found in that in-
strument against the action of the government or of its
departments .... It would not be extended so far as to au-
thorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the States, or
a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without
its consent .... But with these exceptions, it is not per-
ceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be
adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject
of negotiation with a foreign country.'92
Consequently, the Bill of Rights and other constitutional provisions
limit the exercise of the treaty power just as they limit any other con-
stitutional exercise of power by the branches and departments of the
federal government.
The principle that the first eight amendments of the Bill of
Rights, which protect certain individual rights such as freedom of
189. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, art. II, sec. 1; id. amends. XII, XVII.
190. See id. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2, art. III, sec. 1.
191. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
192. Id. at 266-67.
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speech and religion,193 right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,194 the right to due process of law and just compensation for
the public taking of private property,95 and the right to a jury
trial,196 act to limit the treaty power was established in the case of
Reid v. Covert.197 In Reid, two women married to military husbands
were charged with the murder of their husbands while stationed
abroad. Even though the women were civilians, they were subjected
to military court-martial, without the right to trial constitutionally
guaranteed civilians, as permitted by executive agreements entered
into by the United States, Japan and Great Britain. The Supreme
Court held that the executive agreements providing for the jurisdic-
tion of military courts over civilians was unconstitutional. First, it
found that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not allow Congress
to subject persons other than members of the "land and naval Forces"
to military jurisdiction, as provided in the Constitution,19 and that
no treaty or agreement could confer powers on the Executive or Con-
gress that they did not possess under the Constitution. Second, the
Court ruled that the right to a trial by jury was a vital barrier to
governmental arbitrariness, and could not be abrogated by treaty or
agreement. The Court reasoned:
When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of
the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in an-
other land.199
Therefore, the Court ruled that the executive agreements contra-
dicted the Constitution, and the military tribunal could not have ju-
risdiction over the women. Instead, the women were to be given civil
trials accompanied by full constitutional protections.
While constitutional guarantees of individual rights and other
provisions of the Constitution limit the treaty power, the Tenth
Amendment, which provides that powers not delegated to the United
States are reserved to the States, does not. At one time, the argu-
ment was made that the Tenth Amendment served as an independ-
ent limit on the treaty making power of the federal government. This
argument was rejected, however, in the case of Missouri v. Hol-
land.200 Congress had enacted a statute to protect migratory birds in
danger of extinction, which was held invalid by a district court. The
193. U.S. Const. amend. I.
194. Id. amend. IV.
195. Id. amend. V.
196. Id. amends. VI, VII.
197. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
198. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14.
199. 354 U.S. at 6.
200. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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court reasoned that there was no constitutional provision authorizing
Congress to regulate in this area (the case was decided at a time
when the Commerce Clause was still being construed narrowly).
Subsequently, the United States and Great Britain entered into a
treaty protecting migratory birds, and Congress adopted legislation
similar to the earlier migratory bird statute to implement the treaty.
In a case challenging the new statute on the grounds that the
treaty and the new statute violated state's rights protected by the
Tenth Amendment, the Court ruled that there was no constitutional
violation. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
An earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in
pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory
birds within the States had been held bad in the District
Court.... Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while
treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States. It is open to question whether the au-
thority of the United States means more than the formal
acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to
imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is
obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
for the national well being that an act of Congress could not
deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could
201
In other words, in the domestic realm, the Tenth Amendment would
prevent the federal government from exercising powers not delegated
to it in the Constitution. Because the earlier migratory bird statute
did not implement any federal power, it was invalid. The treaty
power, on the other hand, is expressly delegated to the federal gov-
ernment, and the Tenth Amendment does not limit delegated powers.
The later legislation implemented a federal power, namely the treaty
power. Because it did not violate the Bill of Rights, or any constitu-
tional provision limiting acts of Congress, it was a constitutional ex-
ercise of congressional power. Consequently, so long as a treaty does
not confer on Congress the power to act in a manner inconsistent
with any specific provision of the Constitution, it may enlarge the
scope of Congress's affirmative authority.
In the 1950s, some individuals became concerned that the treaty
making power might serve as a tool for ceding sovereignty and under-
mining democracy in the United States. The fear was based on Jus-
tice Holmes's dictum in Missouri v. Holland, stating that the treaty
power is not subject to constitutional limitation, combined with the
201. Id. at 432-33.
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possibility of self-executing treaties. Concern was heightened with
the post-World War II international practice of concluding multilat-
eral treaties with considerable law making importance, such as the
1948 Genocide Convention.20
2
In an attempt to "prohibit the use of the treaty as an instrument
of domestic legislation," and to "prevent its use as a vehicle for sur-
rendering national sovereignty," Senator Bricker proposed a constitu-
tional amendment, known as the Bricker Amendment, to "plug" the
"loophole" of Missouri v. Holland and place limits on the treaty mak-
ing power.203 , Although the proposed amendment changed over the
years of debate, its provisions typically provided that all treaties
would be non-self-executing, and limited the subject matter of trea-
ties to those Congress could enact under its delegated powers in the
absence of a treaty. The Bricker Amendment was ultimately rejected
by Congress in a vote of 60 for and 31 against (one vote short of the
two-third majority required for Congress to propose a constitutional
amendment).20 4 With the subsequent ruling in Reid v. Covert, con-
cern over the treaty power waned, and no new attempts to limit it by
constitutional amendment have been proposed.
F. Judicial Determination of the Place of International Law within
the American Constitutional System
As mentioned above, customary international law is also consid-
ered to be part of United States law, and it will be applied by the
courts whenever cases raise issues under international law. The sta-
tus of customary international law as United States law was affirmed
by Justice Gray when he stated, "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination."
20 5
While customary international law has the status of federal law,
it does not have the constitutional status of supreme law, a status
expressly granted treaties and statutes under the Supremacy Clause.
Instead, customary international law is considered part of United
States common law, and is applicable only in circumstances when the
application of common law is appropriate. Consequently, customary
international law will be applied only in the absence of a federal stat-
ute or an international agreement. Because customary international
law is deemed not the supreme law of the United States, the Last In
202. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
203. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.J. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1953);
Hearings on S.J. Res. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1956).
204. See U.S. Const. art. V.
205. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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Time Doctrine does not apply, as it does to treaties, and, internally
and theoretically, an international custom can be abrogated by a
Congressional act, whether adopted before or after the custom crys-
tallized as law.
20 6
Despite the incorporation of the law of nations into federal com-
mon law, the courts have used customary international law only
sparingly. Nevertheless, the courts will use the law of nations when
there is no corresponding domestic law to apply. The areas in which
customary international law has been effectively enforced in the
courts include the protection of human rights,20 7 the protection of
diplomats, the punishment of piracy and terrorism, the punishment
of war crimes, and the settlement of claims arising from the seizure of
alien property without just compensation.
20
The use of international human rights law in United States
courts is illustrated by the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.209 The
plaintiffs, Dr. Filartiga and his daughter, both citizens of Paraguay
living in the United States, brought suit against another former
Paraguayan government official, Pena-Irala, who was also living in
the United States, for the torture and murder in Paraguay of Dr. Fi-
lartiga's seventeen-year-old son, Joelito. The case was brought pur-
suant to the Alien Torts Statute, a provision of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which provides: "The district court shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
210
In addressing the jurisdictional question of whether the conduct
of Pena-Irala violated the law of nations, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found that it did. The Court ruled that "the universal con-
demnation of torture in numerous international agreements, and the
renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually
all of the nations of the world" established that the act of torture com-
mitted by a state official against a person held in detention violated
"an established norm of international law of human rights, and hence
the law of nations." Among the documents surveyed for evidence of
international custom, the Court relied on provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,211 and the American Convention on
Human Rights.212 The Court then went on to find that international
law protected not only aliens from torture, but also protected citizens
from their own government. Therefore, as the alleged act of torture
206. See L. Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926).
207. See Lillich, "The Constitution and International Human Rights," in Foreign
Affairs, supra n. 26, at 145.
208. See generally materials set out in Franck & Glennon, supra n. 26, at 122-226.
209. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
211. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
212. O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, O:A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. 4 V/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2
(English ed., 1975).
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was a violation of a fundamental international human right, the
Court had jurisdiction over the case as provided by the Alien Tort
Statute.
G. Judicial Review Regarding the Making and Conduct of War
Application of the political question doctrine in the foreign af-
fairs arena is illustrated by the various suits brought in United
States courts challenging the undeclared Vietnam War. The Consti-
tution expressly provides that Congress has the sole power to declare
war, and the power to raise and support the armed forces.213 Despite
these constitutional provisions, numerous wars were fought by the
United States after World War II without an express declaration of
war by Congress, including the Vietnam War. As Presidents commit-
ted more and more troops to the Vietnam conflict and expanded the
scope of the war, several cases were litigated challenging United
States involvement on the grounds that Congress never officially de-
clared war against North Vietnam, and therefore, the war was
unconstitutional.
In one of the first such cases, Atlee v. Laird,214 the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the United States involvement in Vietnam constituted a
"war," and that because Congress had not declared a war, the Presi-
dent was acting unconstitutionally by keeping American forces in
South Vietnam. The court dismissed the case, however, on the
grounds that the complaint presented a non-justiciable political ques-
tion. Questions of whether American participation in South-East
Asia constituted a war, whether Congress had taken sufficient action
to authorize the war, and whether the President was justified in
maintaining troops in Vietnam, in the court's opinion, presented the
kinds of problems characteristic of political questions, such as the un-
availability of judicially manageable standards, the commitment of
the issues to the coordinate branches of government, and the lack of
available information. As a matter of judicial prudence, the court felt
that the matter was better left to the political branches to resolve. If
the President was acting beyond his authority, it was Congress's re-
sponsibility to take appropriate action.
In subsequent cases, the courts moved away from the absolutist
approach in Atlee v. Laird, and ruled that some Congressional in-
volvement is required to authorize a war. For example, in Orlando v.
Laird,2 15 the Second Circuit ruled that there must be some mutual
participation between Congress and the President sufficient to ratify
or authorize military activities. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, in
213. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 11, 12-14.
214. 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
911 (1973).
215. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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combination with draft extensions and budget appropriations, pro-
vided evidence supporting a conclusion that mutual participation by
the Congress existed authorizing military activities. However, a
political question still remained.
[T]he constitutional propriety of the means by which Con-
gress has chosen to ratify and approve the protracted mili-
tary operations in Southeast Asia is a political question. The
form which congressional authorization should take is one of
policy, committed to the discretion of the Congress and
outside the power and competency of the judiciary, because
there are no intelligible and objectively manageable stan-
dards by which to judge such actions.
216
The courts in other cases came to the same conclusion. Even in
Mitchell v. Laird,217 where the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals found that defense appropriations and draft extensions did
not constitute valid assent to the Vietnam War by Congress, the
judges declined to rule for the plaintiffs because review of the Presi-
dent's decision to continue prosecution of the war presented a polit-
ical question.
In Holtzman v. Schlesinger,218 the plaintiffs argued that the
bombing of Cambodia and elsewhere in Indochina in 1973 constituted
a "basic change in the war" such that an express declaration of war
was required. The Second Circuit, reversing a lower district court
decision that ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that whether or not there was a basic change in the
war also presented a political question.
Throughout the Vietnam War litigation, the Supreme Court
avoided ruling on the issues raised. The Supreme Court denied certi-
orari in case after case, often over the strong dissent of Justice Powell
and others. Consequently, the Supreme Court never ruled conclu-
sively on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War, although there is
evidence that at least one justice, Justice Stewart, believed the
United States involvement in Vietnam was unconstitutional.219 Nev-
ertheless, the political question doctrine is still invoked by courts in
cases challenging the Presidential introduction of troops into foreign
conflicts. For example, in Crockett v. Reagan,220 twenty-nine Mem-
bers of Congress brought suit challenging President Reagan's intro-
duction of American military advisors into El Salvador as a violation
of the War Powers Resolution. The court dismissed the case as a non-
justiciable political question on the grounds that the fact-finding re-
216. Id. at 1043-44.
217. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
218. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
219. See Yoder, "A Judge and the War," Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1985, at A21.
220. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
quired to determine whether United States forces had been intro-
duced into hostilities was beyond the ability of the court.
While questions of whether Congress has authorized military ac-
tivities and the level of hostilities faced by United States forces are
non-justiciable, not all issues relating to the conduct of hostilities are
subject to the political question doctrine. The courts will exercise
their jurisdiction if the parties present claims that fall within the
court's traditional expertise. For example, in Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinberger,221 an American citizen living in Honduras, challenged
the United States Government's use of his property in Honduras for
the military training of personnel from the army of El Salvador. The
district court dismissed the case as a non-justiciable political ques-
tion. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
however. The court found that the plaintiffs claims fell within the
normal competence of the courts, in particular its general expertise in
the resolution of property claims. In the court's view, none of the pru-
dential considerations that bar a claim under the political questions
doctrine were present in this case. Reinstating the cause of action,
the court noted that the political question doctrine is "a tempting ref-
uge from the adjudication of difficult constitutional claims," and
warned against its "indiscriminate and overbroad application to
claims properly before the federal courts."
222
VII. THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN (INDIVIDUALS AND NGOs) IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Preamble of the United States Constitution begins with the
words "We the People of the United States . . . ." This reference to
"the people" highlights the central role played by individual human
beings in the American constitutional system. Not only does the Con-
stitution protect the rights of individuals against the government,
but it is through the civic activities of citizens, both in their individ-
ual capacity and as members of groups, that the constitutional sys-
tem of the United States comes alive. The health of the democracy
and the responsiveness of the government to the will of the people
depend directly on the active participation of the American citizen.
The central role of the individual in the American constitutional
system is in no way diminished in the foreign affairs arena. Indeed,
with the growing interdependence of all the nations of the world, for-
eign affairs are simply too important to be left to a few people.
Through a variety of modalities, the individual citizen has the oppor-
tunity to influence the contours of American foreign policy, and con-
tribute to the United States' role in the family of nations.
221. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
222. Id. at 1514.
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Obviously, the most direct impact a citizen has on the United
States foreign policy is through the electoral process. Individuals,
working individually, in political parties, and through nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) devoted to specific issues areas, work to
get candidates on the ballot, support their campaigns with time and
money, and ultimately go to the polls to elect the representatives they
think best represent heir interests. Exercising the right to vote, citi-
zens have the most direct influence on who their Senators, Repre-
sentatives, Presidents and Vice-Presidents will be, and hence, what
kinds of international policies will be pursued by the government.
But citizen input into American foreign policy is not limited only
to elections. Another significant modality for influencing American
foreign policy is through the power of public opinion. Elected repre-
sentatives, even if not immediately facing an up-coming election, are
nevertheless sensitive to the demands and expectations of the gen-
eral citizenry. Publicity and public pressure on any given issue will
influence the decision makers responsible for developing and imple-
menting American foreign policy. The experience during the Viet-
nam War provides a classic example of this process: growing
discontent and protest over the conduct of what became an unpopular
war was one of the factors that eventually forced the government to
withdraw from the conflict. The general lesson of the war was that
when the government in a democracy loses the support of the people,
it will be very difficult to conduct a successful foreign policy.
Ultimately, not only do individual citizens exert an important in-
fluence on the United States government, but a successful foreign
policy also depends on an active and concerned citizenry. The
strength of the democratic system is that it provides a forum for the
clash of competing values and ideas, and a mechanism for their reso-
lution that does not require the resort to civil strife and insurrection.
But if citizens are not involved in the democratic process, their inter-
ests are not adequately represented, and the government drifts away
from the control of the people. When the government ceases to repre-
sent the values of the governed in its foreign policy, it is ultimately
the citizen's responsibility, exercising their rights as citizens, to make
the changes necessary to assure that their values are adequately re-
flected in the nation's policies.
Organically, the Constitution recognizes three branches of gov-
ernment as the decision making organs of the federal government. In
reality, individuals are involved in all seven decision functions that
characterize the process of authoritative decision making in the for-
eign affairs arena: intelligence, promoting, prescribing, invoking, ap-
plying, terminating, and appraising.
The intelligence function relates to the gathering, processing,
and disseminating of information essential to decision making. Each
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branch of the federal government participates in the intelligence
function regarding foreign affairs. The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the National Security Council, and the diplomatic corp provide
information to the Executive, congressional investigators report to
congressional committees, and the courts receive evidence about con-
ditions abroad in appropriate cases. But the three branches do not
have a monopoly on information or fact-finding. In an open, demo-
cratic society, individuals and groups are constantly involved in the
process of collecting and reporting information. Individuals, working
through NGOs, document human rights abuses around the world,
monitor environmental conditions, collect economic indicators, and
report on political, social and cultural development worldwide. The
press, with individual reporters scattered around the globe, keep us
supplied with current information about events taking place in dis-
tant places.
The promoting function is defined as the advocacy of general pol-
icies and urging proposals. The involvement of individuals and
NGOs in the promotion of new prescriptions is a distinctive charac-
teristic of a democratic form of government. Individuals contact their
local representatives, making demands and pressing their ideas.
NGOs send lobbyists to Washington to promote group interests. Both
use the means of mass communication to build interest and support,
mobilizing public opinion and pressuring politicians to achieve policy
goals on matters of foreign aid, international trade, relations with
foreign states, and international law-making. For example, after
years of lobbying efforts by Amnesty International, International
League for Human Rights, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
and other NGOs, the United States finally ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.223 Next on the agenda is rati-
fication or accession to other human rights treaties including the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
224
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,225 and the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.226
While the prescribing function, or the projecting of community
policy through lawmaking, is constitutionally delegated to govern-
ment officials, individuals also play an important role. For example,
223. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
224. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
225. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N.G.A. Res. 34/180 (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 194,
U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981).
226. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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during negotiation by the Office of the United States Trade Represen-
tative over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
NGOs were actively engaged in influencing and shaping provisions of
the agreement relating to environmental and labor issues. The ulti-
mate passage of NAFTA by the Congress reflected to some extent the
perceptions of congressional members about the degree of support of
the American people.
Individuals in the United States are particularly active in the
invoking function - the provisional characterization of certain con-
duct in terms of conformity or deviation from community norms.
America is an alert and litigious society. There is hardly a govern-
ment action that does not go unchallenged in the courts, as illus-
trated by the variety and scope of cases in the foreign affairs field.
Individuals are also active before executive and administrative agen-
cies, invoking procedures and seeking remedies in such diverse areas
as international trade, environmental issues, and immigration.
In terms of application, or the characterization and execution of
prescriptions in concrete situations, this role is traditionally consid-
ered to be within the purview of the Executive, as the branch respon-
sible for executing the laws of the United States, and the courts, as
the branch responsible for applying laws to actual cases. While the
final application of the law in any given case is subject to the discre-
tion of the judge, individuals also participate in the process as amicus
curiae, or "friend of the court." An amicus curiae is generally an indi-
vidual attorney, private citizen, or representative of an NGO, invited
to present information on questions of law relating to a case currently
before the court. Through this process, individuals have had the op-
portunity to influence directly judicial deliberations. The Lawyers'
Committee for International Human Rights, a New York based NGO,
for example, has successfully used the amicus curiae procedure to se-
cure the right of refugees and asylum seekers in the United States
courts.
As in the promoting function, individuals and NGOs are also ac-
tively and continuously engaged in the termination function - the
process of putting an end to an existing prescription - and the ap-
praising function - the critical evaluation of community policies in
terms of community goals. The First Amendment freedom of expres-
sion, one of the most cherished of the rights protected by the Consti-
tution, is directly related to these functions; in the United States an
individual is free to criticize the government, and to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances. One does not have to be an ex-
pert in order to participate in appraising United States foreign policy.
Although the contribution of scholars, practitioners, and commenta-
tors is important, participation by ordinary individuals is a key as-
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pect of the democratic form of government, and a necessary
component of its successful operation.
In conclusion, the conventional wisdom is that the power to con-
duct foreign affairs in the United States is exercised by a relatively
few high government officials. In reality, individuals from all walks
of life are constantly involved in the processes through which Ameri-
can foreign policy is formed - in an open, democratic society, anyone
may make a contribution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A critical appraisal of the constitutional system of the United
States reveals a dynamic constitutive process of authoritative deci-
sion in which all participants in American society act to shape and
share values, and establish the norms and laws that govern society.
Through an on-going process of communication, practice, and deci-
sion, the demands and expectations of succeeding American genera-
tions are fulfilled, giving "life" to the ideals enshrined in a document
drafted over two hundred years ago.
A core feature of this constitutional process is the commitment to
the protection of fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals, as
guaranteed by the dynamic Bill of Rights. In terms of prescription,
the Bill of Rights gives special recognition and protection to the most
highly cherished and eeply demanded rights by express and formal
prescription in the constitutive document itself. In terms of invoca-
tion, individuals can challenge the deprivation of their individual
rights and obtain remedies for their violation by invoking them
before appropriate decision makers. In terms of application, special
provisions are made for the application of intensely demanded
human rights prescriptions against violators, whether within or
without government. Finally, in terms of termination, the human
rights protected by the Bill of Rights cannot be terminated except by
extraordinary effort (such as by amendment o the Constitution) or in
the same way in which they were created.2
27
The features that characterize the constitutive processes of the
United States generally can also be observed in the conduct of Ameri-
can foreign affairs. The foreign affairs powers of the United States
are vested in the federal government, and constitutional principles
such as federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances
apply to the conduct of foreign affairs by the President and Congress.
In addition, the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and in par-
ticular the Bill of Rights, also apply, qualifying the exercise of foreign
affairs powers by government officials. But when viewed in the con-
227. For a more detailed description of the Bill of Rights in action, see generally
Chen, supra n. 5.
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text of an expanded notion of foreign affairs, all the features of the
constitutive process that govern domestic relations also affect Ameri-
can international relations. Even though foreign affairs are formally
vested in the federal government, states, local governments, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and individuals all have a role in shaping
and sharing in American foreign policy decisions.
Questions regarding formal structural theories of American gov-
ernment, such as the theory of separation of powers, are also increas-
ingly difficult to resolve as the line between matters of international
concern and domestic jurisdiction blurs. Formally, the President is
the sole representative of the United States in foreign relations. But
as domestic problems increasingly require regional or international
cooperation for their resolution, Congress's role in the establishment
of foreign affairs, particularly as the regulator of foreign commerce,
becomes ever more relevant and important.
Ultimately, however, the constititutional system in the United
States seeks to establish a rule of law wherein no person, whether
common citizen or high government official, is above the law. The
power dimension in the American system is tempered by and in ten-
sion with the human rights dimension; the protections of the Bill of
Rights apply to the acts of government officials, whether acting in the
domestic, or the international realm. International treaties and
agreements, as a part of federal law, are part of the supreme law
under the Constitution and binding not only on the federal govern-
ment,228 but state and local governments as well.
The success of the constitutional system in the United States de-
pends in large measure on a constitutional culture that helps it
thrive. The constitutional experience is an on-going process of clari-
fying and securing common goals and interests. It is a practice where
community members work together to shape and share important
values. Without input from the citizens who make up American soci-
ety, the constitutional system would soon become irrelevant, or
worse. Through ongoing effort and struggle, Americans have kept
their constitution "alive."
Another condition necessary for the successsful functioning of
the American system is an independent judiciary. Since the days of
Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary has served as a check on the power
of the Executive and the Congress, often protecting minority inter-
ests from overreaching by the majority. Without a judiciary capable
228. What is less clear is the extent to which the rule of law prevents the President
from violating customary international law, either to serve domestic needs or as an
attempt to establish a new norm of customary law. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). See also Restatement,
supra n. 77 § 115 Rep. Note 3; Agora, "May the President Violate Customary Interna-
tional Law," 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 913 (1986).
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of functioning independently from the other branches, and from poli-
tics in general, the advances in human rights for which the United
States courts are known might not have been possible. To a large
measure, the Court's prestige and expectations of authoritativeness
derive from the perception that its decisions are generally based on
principle, not political expediency.
A responsible press is also a necessary condition for a successful
constitutional culture. In a system that depends on an informed elec-
torate, citizens must have accurate and relevant information about
the activities of their elected officials and the consequences and effec-
tiveness of public policies adopted by the government. A press that
reports only on the trivial, irrelevant, or exploitative does a disservice
to the democracy in which it operates.
Finally, the American constitutional system is characterized by
the vigorous role played by the individual. It is ultimately for the
protection of the individual that the constitution was designed. And
it is the responsibility of the individual to keep the system working.
All members of American society have a role in the functioning of the
American constitutive process, whether it be the reporter who col-
lects the information regarding America's role in world affairs, the
lobbyist who promotes a new approach to international environmen-
tal law, a lawyer who files a complaint to vindicate someone's human
rights, or a private citizen who goes to the polls to elect a President.
This is the essence of American constitutional culture and democracy
in action.
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